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DO SOME EMPLOYERS SHARE THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS  OF GENERAL TRAINING?
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the central propositions of the human capital theory of on-the-job training is that
workers pay all the costs and receive all the benefits of general training (see Ehrenberg and
Smith 1996, Filer, Hammermesh and Rees 1996, Borjas 1996, Kaufman 1986). Since general
training raises a worker's ability to be productive in other organizations as well as the one
providing the training, the training firm must pay a wage commensurate with the trained worker's
new higher level of productivity if they are to prevent the loss of their trained workers. Since the
workers, not the firm, get the benefits of the training, "firms [will] provide general training only if
they [do] not have to pay any of the costs" (Becker 1962 p. 13). Since the training is of value to
prospective trainees, equilibrium in the training market requires that "employees pay for general
on-the-job training by receiving wages below what could be received elsewhere" (Becker 1962
p. 13) in a job offering no training. Is this correct? Do "Workers pay all the costs" of training in
skills that are technically general (i.e. useful at other firms)--WPAC for short? Do "workers
receive all the benefits" of general training ("WRAB" for short)?
The key assumptions that produce the strong WPAC and WRAB predictions are: (a)
labor markets are competitive, (b) workers can finance general OJT investments by borrowing
at a fixed interest rate and (c) technically general skills can be cheaply signaled to other
potential employers.
We argue below that most work environments violate one or more of these assumptions.
When more realistic assumptions are substituted, theory's predictions change. A model of OJT
that incorporates imperfectly signaled general skills and/or liquidity constraints makes much
weaker predictions: "workers pay much of the costs" of technically general training and "receive
much of the benefits." These weaker predictions of a more realistic theory of general OJT will be
referred to as "WPMC" and "WRMB" respectively.
It is these weaker WPMC and WRMB predictions that have been tested and generally
supported by the empirical literature on employer training and wage profiles. The much stronger
WPAC and WRAB predictions have, until recently, been impossible to test because data on
productivity growth, the cost of employer training and the generality of training have been
unavailable (Garen 1988). This paper remedies this gap in the literature by analyzing data sets--
the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects Employer Survey and the National Federation of
Independent Business survey-- that have the measures of the generality of training, the costs of
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training and ratio scale measures of productivity growth necessary to test the WPAC and WRAB
hypotheses.
We will begin by defining very explicitly three hypotheses that will be tested in
this paper. We define W1 and W2 as the wages during (time period 1) and after (time
period 2) general training respectively and g as the increase in productivity generated by
general training that costs the firm C(g) to provide. Then WPAC implies, ceteris paribus,
that:
HYP 1) ¶W1        = -1
                        ¶C(g)
In cross section models predicting starting wage rates, cet ris paribus means the human capital
characteristics of the worker and non-pecuniary attractiveness of the job must be held constant.
WPAC and WRAB also generate a prediction about how changing one's employer
affects the derivative of wage growth with respect to training. If training obtained at firm 'k' is
either completely general or partially specific, WPAC and WRAB imply:
HYP 2) ¶(W2k-W1k) > ¶(W2j¹k-W1k)
                ¶C(gk)           ¶C(gk)
Hypothesis 2 says that because training is generally to some degree specific to the firm, its
impact on wage growth should be greatest for workers who stay with the firm. If, by contrast, the
skills developed are general, but employers are sharing training costs because their liquidity
constrained workers are unable or unwilling to finance all training costs (and employers,
therefore, lose their investment when turnover occurs), we would expect wage impacts of
training to be larger for workers who leave the training firm:
NOT HYP 2) ¶(W2k--W1k) < ¶(W2j¹k--W1k)
                                    ¶C(gk)           ¶C(gk)
In a two period model WPAC and WRAB together imply that productivity growth and
wage growth have the following ceteris paribus relationship:
HYP 3) ¶(W2 – W1) -- ¶(P2 – P1) =   ¶g   + 1 -  ¶g     = 1 > 0
               ¶C(g)              ¶C(g)       ¶C(g)          ¶C(g)
Hypothesis 3 says that general training has a larger effect on wage growth than on productivity
growth and the gap between wage and productivity growth effects is the reduction in the cost of
general training that occurs between periods 1 and 2. This is a difference of differences
estimator that should be free of biases from unmeasured ability, unmeasured job characteristics
or measurement error in the training variables.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we expand and generalize Hashimoto's
elegant theory of the sharing of the costs and benefits of specific training and show why with our
modifications firms choose to offer front loaded compensation packages in which they share the
marginal costs of general training with their employees. In this model employers share the
marginal costs and benefits of general training because the firm providing general training is
better able to assess the success of that training than other employers and this information
asymmetry effectively transforms skills that are technically general into skills that are
behaviorally specific. In addition employers have better access to capital markets than
employees.1 Liquidity constrained new hires are unable to finance large investments in general
training, so employers attract new hires by offering to share some of the costs of increased
investments in general training.
It is match specific quasi rents during the second and later years of tenure that cause
wage growth to be slower than productivity growth during the initial year on a job. Match specific
quasi rents are generated by specific training, but also by sorting, selective turnover and
transition costs such as loss of reputation from being dismissed. Consequently, wage profiles
during the first year of tenure are subject to so many influences that comparisons of average
rates of wage and productivity growth cannot be used to determine whether employers are
sharing the costs and benefits of general training (in the sense of hypothesis 1-3). Who pays for
general training is best addressed by examining the first derivative of wage and productivity with
respect to training.
While some of these results have appeared in earlier papers (e.g. Parsons 1972; Glick
and Feuer 1984; Feuer, Glick and Desai 1987), much of the recent training and wage growth
literature appears to ignore the effect of difficulties of signaling newly acquired general skills,
differential access to capital markets, and large match specific quasi-rents not caused by
specific training on wage growth and incentives to invest in training (Garen 1988).
Sections 3, 4 and 5 review the empirical evidence on the three hypotheses.
Section III-- Hypothesis 1--Wages Should be Lower When Training is Underway
(1) Some employers are offering and sometimes indeed requiring that employees
take training in skills that are clearly general,
                                                 
1 Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his 1962 paper. "Since employer specific skills are part of the
intangible assets or good will of firms and can be offered as collateral along with tangible assets, capital would be more readily
available for specific than for general investments (p.42)." He did not, however, explicitly analyze how such constraints might
influence the tenure profile of wages and thus induce employers to share the costs of general training. Parsons (1972) points out
that "The worker's ...discount rate will affect the firm's choice of wage policies ....It can be shown that firms will decrease the
worker's share of specific investment as the workers discount the future more heavily (p.1129)."
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(2) 'Trainees generally do not have lower wage jobs than equally qualified workers
who receive no training,
(3) When new hires for the same job are compared, those who require extra training
are paid less but not enough less during the training period to compensate the
firm for the additional training costs.
(4) Tracking wage changes reveals no tendency for wage rates to decline when a
worker enters an employer sponsored formal training program.
Section IV-- Hypothesis 2--The Impact of Turnover on the Return to Formal Training.
(1) Training has a bigger effect on the wage rates of workers who leave the training
firm than on workers who stay.
.Section V-- Hypothesis 3--The Wage and Productivity Impacts of General Training
(1) Contrary to HYP 3, general training has significantly larger effects on productivity
growth than wage growth.
The paper concludes with a summary of evidence that some employers share the costs and
benefits of general training occurring at their firm. The theory presented in section 2 offers two
explanations for this, but others are possible. These other possibilities are also briefly
discussed.
II. THEORY
In this section we present a formal exposition of a theory of training and compensation
packages that predicts the kinds of empirical findings just reviewed. The theory to be presented
owes much to Hashimoto's (1981) elegant formulation of how workers and firms share the costs
and benefits of investments that are specific to a match between worker and firm. Sorting
effects, transfer costs, turnover events as signals, imperfect signaling of the outcomes of
general training and differential access to capital markets are all incorporated into one model.
Under certain simplifying assumptions the model generates HYP 1, 2 and 3. However, when
more realistic assumptions are made, HYP 1, 2 and 3 are contradicted.
The firm's training level and wage profile will be analyzed in a simple two period model.
Training is assumed to produce two types of skills: general skills (g) which are useful at other
firms and specific skills (h) which are productive only at the firm providing training. The cost of
the training C(g, h) are incurred in the first period and the benefits are received in the second
period.
There are two random elements in the model. The first is the utility that a worker can
attain by leaving the firm at the beginning of the second period, and the second is the worker's
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second period productivity in this firm after the training is completed. We assume that wages
and productivity in the two periods are the following.
    Worker Worker
Productivity   Utility
1st period at the firm P     W1
2nd period at the firm P+g+h+eo W
2
2nd period at other firms if quit U(g) - T + e
2nd period at other firms if fired/laid off U(g) -T –Fb + e
where
P is the worker's productivity without training
g is the increment in productivity due to general training
h is the increment in productivity at the firm due to specific training
eo is the random factor in productivity in this firm which captures one element of the
           quality of the match at the training firm
W1, W2 are the first and second period wages at the firm
U(g)+e is the utility of the best alternative job if one leaves voluntarily. This depends on
the amount of general skill and a random factor which measures from the
worker's point of view the quality of the firm-wo ker match at the alternative firm
relative to the match at the training firm.
T is the costs of transition if the change in jobs is initiated by the worker: moving costs,
damaged reputation from having a quit signal on one's resume, lost income while
waiting for the next job to start.
Fb is the additional transition costs imposed on the worker over and above T, if the exit
is involuntary: the additional damage to the worker's reputation from being
permanently laid off or fired rather than leaving voluntarily, the lost income due to
the wait until another job is found.
Turnover decisions are made in two stages. At the end of the first period, the worker
makes the first move by deciding whether to quit or to express an intention to stay. If the worker
quits, he/she obtains a job which offers a utility level of U(g) + T+ e. The worker but not his
employer learns about a at the end of the first period.
Then the firm decides whether to keep or dismiss the worker by comparing the second
period wage to the worker's productivity in the firm, P+g+h+eo. If the worker's productivity is less
than the second period wage, the firm will dismiss the worker. The random factor eo is 
measure of the quality of the firm-worker match at the current firm. If the worker is dismissed at
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this stage he/she will be forced to look for work while unemployed and will incur an additional
transition cost of Fb. Therefore, the worker's first stage decision will take into account the risk of
involuntary turnover in the second stage.
At the beginning of the first period neither the worker nor the firm knows the worker's
exact productivity in this firm and in other firms. The firm offers wage package (W1,W2) based on
information obtained in the interview and from references and the nature of uncertainties
involved, i.e. the probability density function's of q,, and e. In the first period, the firm trains the
worker, taking into account the possible loss of the investment due to a separation in the next
period. Training investment takes two forms, investment in firm specific skills and general skills.
General training increases the wage that the worker can obtain in alternative employment as
well as his productivity in this firm. Workers accept the job offer from this firm if the wage
package and training plan are generous enough to attract workers in a competitive labor market.
In deciding, the worker takes account of possible gains or losses from a voluntary or involuntary
separation. We assume the worker and the firm have the same prior distributions on the
uncertainties surrounding the worker's productivity in this firm and worker's income opportunity
outside the firm in the second period. Further, we assume that both the firm and the worker are
risk neutral.
The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted sum of profit from the two periods by
choosing wage rates in two periods, W1 and W2, and an amount of general training, g, and
specific training, h subject to the constraint that the wage offer and amount of training are
generous enough to attract new hires in a competitive labor market. The firm's expected profit
maximization problem when e and eo ar  independent is written as:
(1) Max P - C(g, h) – W1 + ¶a.[Pr(S)Pr(K)(P+g+h+E(eo I K) – W2)]
g, h, W1, W2
Subject to the constraint
(2) R < W1 +
¶b[Pr(S)Pr(K)W2 + (1-Pr(S))(U(g)-T+E(e I (Q)) + Pr(S)(1-Pr(K))(U(g)-T+E(e l S)-Fb)]
or R < W1 + ¶b[Pr(S)Pr(K){W2 - U(g) + T - E(e I S) – 1–Pr (K)Fb} + U(g) – T]
                                                                                     Pr (K)
where
E(eo I K) is the conditional expectation of eo given that the firm wishes to keep the worker.
E(eo I K) > 0.
E(e I Q) is the conditional expectation of a given that the worker quits the firm. E(e IQ) > 0.
E(e I S) is the conditional expectation of a given the worker wishes to stay in the firm.
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E(e I S) < 0.
¶a and ¶b are the discount factors of the firm and worker, respectively
Pr(S) is the prior probability the worker is willing to stay with the firm
Pr(K) is the prior probability the firm is willing to keep the worker
R is the level of expected utility the worker can attain in the competitive labor market.
At the end of the first period, the worker learns what utility can be obtained by taking a
job at another firm. Based on this information, the worker's decision rule is:
STAY IF Pr(K)W2 + (1-Pr(K))(U(g)-T-Fb +e) > U(g) - T + e
The right hand side of the inequality is the utility level of the alternative job. It is affected by the
amount of general training that other employers perceive the worker to have obtained, g, and
the costs of making a voluntary transition, (T), and the random term, (e), which captures the
worker's relative evaluation of two jobs. The left-hand side of the inequality is the expected
income if he/she wishes to stay at the firm. Note that the expected income of choosing to stay
takes into account the risk of being fired or laid off and suffering the additional transition costs
(Fb) that involuntary turnover imposes on the worker. The probability of a worker wishing to stay
in the firm, Pr(S), is:
(3) Pr(S) = Pr(e < W2 - U(g) + T – 1-Pr(K) Fb) = F(W2 - U(g) + T – 1-Pr(K) Fb)
                                                         Pr(K)                                         Pr(K)
where F is the cumulative density function of e.
Note that the argument for the cumulative density function, F, contains the term
– 1-Pr(K) Fb, is minus the odds of being laid off or fired times the additional transition costs, Fb,
     Pr(K)
that result from involuntary turnover. This implies that if a worker believes there is a high
probability of being laid off or fired, he is more likely to quit.
By the end of the first period, the firm knows the worker's productivity in the second
period and whether the worker wants to stay. It then lays off or fires the worker if P+g+h+eo is
less than the second period wage. Consequently, Pr(K) is written as
(4) Pr(K) = Pr(P+g+h+eo > W
2) = 1 - F0(W2-P-g-h)
where F0 is the cumulative density function of eo.
Denoting the probability density function of e and eo by f and f0  the first order condition for the
second period wage is written as:
(5) 0 = da [¶Pr(S)Pr(K)Qa - Pr(S)Pr(K)] + db [Pr(S)Pr(K) - ¢0Pr(S)Qb]
where Qa and Qb are defined as
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Qa = P+g+h+E(eo I K)-W
2 > 0,
Qb = W
2 - (U(g) - T – Fb + E(e I S)) > 0.
¶Pr(S) = f(1-v)
  ¶W2
v =   f0 Fb = gk fb
          Pr(K)
2     Pr(K)
gk = the elasticity of the firm's keep rate, Pr(K), with respect to the 2nd period wage times
       minus one. gk = f0 W2/ Pr(K) > 0.
          f b = Fb/W
2  is the ratio of the transition cost if fired to the 2nd period wage.
Qa is the firm's expected profit on workers who want to stay with the firm and which the firm
wants to keep. Alternatively, it is the employer's share of 2nd period quasi-rents. Qb s the gain
the worker receives from not being dismissed or alternatively the worker's share of 2nd period
quasi rents. It is the difference between the second period wage, W2, and expected utility if
dismissed, (U(g)-T-Fb +E(e I S)). Note that f0/Pr(K)2 is the derivative of the odds of being kept
with respect to the second period wage. An increase in the second period wage has two effects
on the worker's decision to stay. The direct effect increases the desire to stay. The second
effect is that it raises the odds of being permanently laid off or fired and incurring the added
transition costs Fb. While this second effect lowers the probability of staying, we may reasonably
assume that the total effect of a wage increase on Pr(S) is positive,( i.e. 0<v< 1 ) because the
elasticity of the keep rate, gK, is not likely to exceed 1 and the extra transition cost of an
involuntary termination is probably less than 20 percent of the 2nd period wage.
The first order conditions for specific and general training are (6) and (7).
(6) Ch = daPr(K)[Pr(S) + (¶Pr(S)/¶h) Qa] + dbPr(S)f0Qb
where Cb = ¶C/¶h, ¶Pr(S)/¶h = fv,
(7) Cg = daPr(K)[Pr(S) + (¶Pr(S)/¶g)Qa] + db [1-Pr(K)Pr(S))Ub + f0Pr(S)Qb]
where Cg = ¶C/¶g, Ug = ¶U/¶g, ¶Pr(S)/¶g = f(-Ug + v)
These conditions can be more simply represented by:
(6’) Ch = daPr(SK)[1 + gsvqa] + dbPr(SK)gKqb
(7’) Cg = daPr(SK)[1 + gs(Ug + v) qa] + db[(1-Pr(SK))Ug + Pr(SK)gkqb]
where
Pr(SK) = Pr(S)Pr(K) is the probability the worker is at the firm in the second period
qa = Qa /W
2, the ratio of the firm's quasi rent to the 2nd period wage
qb = Qb/W
2, the ratio of the worker's quasi rent to the 2nd period wage
gs =  the elasticity of the worker's stay rate with respect to the 2nd
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        period wage. gs = f(1-v)W2 /Pr(S) > 0.
Also the optimal wage in the first period, W1 , is determined so that the constraint (2) is binding.
The first order conditions--(5), (6), (7) and (2) with equality constraint-characterize the optimal
wage-training package the firm will offer. In what follows, we examine the economic implications
of these conditions.
 Signaling General Skills to Other Employers
We will now specify the income opportunity outside the firm, U(g) + e, in more detail. We
write U(g) in the following form:
(8)  U(g) = P + ^g
where P is the productivity of the worker without the general training received in the first period
and ^g is the increment to the wage offer due to general training. Employers use the interview
and the reputation of the previous employer to predict the true value of the general training. The
estimate by other employers of the productivity gain due to the original firm's general training is
^g.
Other potential employers cannot observe the exact amount of general human capital
that is produced by the training. Katz and Ziderman (1990) provide an excellent discussion of
why the worker's next employers may not be able to accurately assess a workers general skills
even in the long run. If they can eventually make that assessment the knowledge becomes
private information and is not shared with other potential employers. The signal that provides
the general labor market information on an individual worker's general skill level contains a good
deal of noise. Denoting the signal that other employers receive by g* , we assume the following
relation:
(9) g* = g + u
where a is a noise independent of g.
Given the signal, g* , other firms predict the true level of general skill. Under the
quadratic loss function, the best linear predictor of general skill, ^g, is:
(10) ^g = E(g I J) + b(g* - E(g I J)) = E(g I J) + b[g – E(g I J)] + bu
where E(g I J) is the conditional mean of general human capital of the particular class of job
seekers given information set J. J represents occupation, industry, and firm size of the previous
job and background characteristics of the individual. Therefore, Ug is:
(11) Ug = b =       var(g I J)        < 1,
                      var(g I J) + var(u)
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where var(g l J) is the conditional variance of g given J (see Leamer pp. 51-55). This implies
that a unit increase of technically general skill results in less than proportional increases in other
firms' wage offers.
Choosing the Level of Training
The first order condition for specific capital, (6'), says that the marginal cost of
investment in specific capital is equated to the marginal discounted revenue to the firm, the
discount factor times the retention rate and the marginal increase in the stay rate resulting from
the reduced probability of being terminated involuntarily times the share of the second period
wage that is a quasi rent for the employer,{daPr(SK)[1+gsvqa]} plus the discounted marginal
benefit to the worker of the specific training. The benefit of specific training to the worker is
captured by the second term of (6'). The increased productivity makes the firm less likely to
dismiss the worker. This effect is captured by gK, the elasticity of the keep rate with respect to
the second period wage. In (6’) gK is multiplied by qb, the share of the second period wage that
is a quasi rent for the worker.
The first order condition for general training, (7 or 7’) characterizes the optimal amount of
general training. The marginal cost of general training is equated to the discounted marginal
revenue to the firm plus the discounted marginal benefit to the worker. The marginal revenue to
the firm from general training has two elements. The first element is the marginal product of a
dollar of expenditure on general training for the workers who are going to stay with the firm
(Pr(S)Pr(K)). The second element measures the loss the firm is likely to experience because
with given W2, quit rates will rise. The higher level of general skill implies better alternative
income opportunities for the worker. For a given second period wage, quits will rise by f(Ug - v).
Per quit, the loss the firm experiences is Pr(K)Qa-- the probability the firm wants to keep the
worker times the quasi rent received by the firm from those workers it keeps.
The marginal benefit of general training to the worker also has two elements. The first
element is that, given he or she is leaving the firm, (voluntarily or involuntarily) general training
increases the wage offer in other employment. The second element reflects the fact that the
increased productivity makes the firm less likely to dismiss the worker. This benefits the worker,
and the amount of the benefit is the worker's quasi rent (Qb) multiplied by the probability that the
individual wants to stay, (Pr(S)). The worker benefit of reduced risks of dismissal tends to offset
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the loss the employer experiences from the quits that are induced by the rise in other firm's
wage offers.2
Substituting the first order conditions for W2 and B = Ug and rearranging terms, the
condition describing the equilibrium level of general human capital is:
(12) Cg = daPr(SK)(1-b) + dbb + dbPr(SK)(1-b)(gKqb – v)
                                  (1-v)                           (1-v)
Equation (12) implies that investment in general OJT increases with the firm's and the
worker's discount factor (da and db) and the retention rate, and decreases if the marginal cost
schedule shifts up. The total derivative of q with respect to v is given by:
(13) ¶Cg = {da - db[1 -  gK   (qb –   fb__   )]} Pr(SK) (1-b)gK + [da + db (gK – v)] (1-b)¶Pr(SK) > 0
             ¶v                       (1-v)        Pr(K)       Pr(K)(1-v)                                     (1-v) ¶v
Thus an increase in the cost of firing causes increased investment in both general and specific
human capital primarily because of its tendency to reduce turnover.
If other firms fully perceive the quality of training provided by the firm (b =1), the
condition reduces to setting the marginal cost of training (Cg) equal to db, the worker's discount
factor. If other firms cannot perceive differentials in training quality (b = 0), the condition
becomes identical to that for specific human capital. The inability of other firms to perceive all of
the firm to firm variations in the amount of general human capital has the effect of dividing the
marginal returns to general human capital into two parts. The share of the marginal increase in
skill that the worker is assured of getting whether or not he/she stays at the firm (b) is
discounted by the worker's rate of time preference. The share that is perceived only by the firm
that provides the training (1-b ) is depreciated by the retention rate and discounted by the
employer's internal rate of return. Improvements in the signals of general training (i.e. an
increase in b) will increase investment in general training if and only if:
(14) ¶Cg = db - da Pr(SK) - dbPr(SK)gK (qb –   fb     ) + [da + db(gK-v)] (1-b) ¶Pr(SK) > 0
            ¶b                (1-v)           (1-v)             Pr(K)                           (1-v)     ¶b
This expression will tend to be greater than zero when new hires have high turnover rates, the
worker's discount factor (db) is not much smaller than the employer's discount factor (da) and an
                                                 
2 Studies of quit and layoff rates obtain wage elasticity estimates that range between 2 and .3 (Ehrenberg and Smith 1987;
Bishop 1981 Chapter 8). This implies that the elasticities of stay and keep rates are even lower and that da¡s(-Ug + v)qa and
db¡Kqb are small.
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increase in the visibility of the training to other employers does not lower the retention rate by
very much. On the other hand, if turnover rates are not high, worker discount factors are a small
fraction of employer discount factors and retention rates drop significantly when training
becomes more visible, the inequality is likely to be reversed and an increase in the quality of the
signals of skills learned will decrease investment in general OJT.
Choosing the Wage Structure
Substituting (8) into the first order condition for W2, rearranging terms and making use of
the assumption that competitive equilibrium implies that the expected profit from hiring the
marginal worker is zero, the optimal wage rates for the two periods may be written as follows: 
(15) W2 = [P + h + g + E(eo I K)] - q[h + (g-^g) + T + Fb + E(eo I K) – E(e I S)] – (da -db) W2
                                                                                                                                 dags +dbgK
(16) W1  = P – C(g, h) + daPr(S)Pr(K){q[h + g-^g + T + Fb + E(eo I K) – E(e I S)] + (da-db)W2}
                                                                                                                                    dags +dbgK
where  q =   dbgK    .   is the employer’s share of the costs of specific human capital investments
                 dags+dbgK     and of quasi rents
Equation (15) implies that the expected profit from the worker staying with the firm is positive.
Since in long run equilibrium, competition among firms brings the expected profit of the firm to
zero, the wage rate in the first period must be higher than the worker's productivity net of
training cost by a compensating amount. Thus our model predicts that in the early stage of
employment, productivity net of training cost grows faster than the wage rate. The firm's net
profit is negative in the investment period but the loss is compensated in the second period
when the firm receives the return from human capital investment.
The wage offer in the second period is the expected productivity of the worker,
P+g+h+E(eo I K), less the second and third terms in (15). The expression in the second set of
brackets is the difference (for those who are kept and want to stay) between the worker's
productivity in the firm, P+g+h+E(eo I K), and the utility of the worker's best alternative job if
he/she is laid off or fired, P+^g-T-Fb +E(e I S). The second term of 15 and 16 indicates that
given the value of q, the following factors reduce the firm's second period wage offer (and also
raise the firm's first period wage offer):
-- Transition costs (T + Fb )
-- The difference between a worker's true general human capital, g, and other
employer's perception of his general human capital, ^g. (This could be positive or
negative depending upon whether the firm provides more or less general training
than is average for that occupation and industry) and
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-- The average unattractiveness of alternative employment for workers ho want to
stay, (-E(e I S)).
Costly investments in firm specific training—e.g. h for which C(h) » --lower first period
wages by less than the costs of training, increase second period wages by less than the
productivity benefits of training. As a result, training accelerates wage growth but by less than it
accelerates the growth of productivity net of training costs.
Costless increases in second period firm specific productivity tend to raise wage rates in
both periods. Examples include:
-- Firm specifc learning by doing [hd for which C(hd) = 0]; and
-- The firm's expected gain from having the option of dismissing less productive
workers, (E(eo I K)).
These two factors have an ambiguous effect on the rate of wage growth. An increase in the
importance of either of these two factors will lower the rate of wage growth if: daPr(K)q > 1q
Also, other things being equal, the firm's second period wage offer declines if q, the
employer's share of quasi rents, increases. Factors that makes q l rger are:
-- The wage elasticity of the keep rate increases relative to the elasticity of the worker's
willingness to stay at the firm. (i.e. gK is large relative to gs ). This could be caused by ¢ 0
being large relative to f  or by v being close to 1.
-- The worker's valuation of future earnings grows relative to the firm's valuation.
(i.e. da/db becomes larger).
Workers must pay higher interest rates when they borrow than employers and also tend
to face higher marginal tax rates during the payoff period than the training period. The third term
of (15) and (16) represents the effects of their consequent tendency to discount future returns
more heavily than employers. Since the error term in the quit relationship does not have a
degenerate distribution, the supply of trained labor is not infinitely elastic. Bloch (1979) cross
section analysis of turnover in 49 manufacturing industries, for example, found wage elasticities
of -1.3 for quit rates and .85 for the layoff rates when the lagged accession rate was included in
the model. The supply of untrained labor, however, is assumed to be infinitely elastic at R. New
hires take second period wages into account when evaluating the firm's job offer, however, so
the decline in the elasticity of labor supply with the worker's tenure influences the wage
structure only when the firm and its workers discount the future at different rates. The
compensation packages reflect the worker's preference for compensation now rather than later.
Thus, the third term of (15) and (16) implies that the firm's second period wage will be reduced
and the first period wage increased to the extent that:
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-- The elasticities of the worker's stay rate, -gs, and of the firm's keep rate, gK, with
respect to the firm's second period wage are small.
-- The firm's discount factor is large relative to the worker's discount factor, (da-db is
large).
Most young workers are liquidity constrained-- that is they are unable to shift as much
consumption from the future into the present as they would like because they have neither
assets which can be depleted nor access to credit at reasonable terms. In the early 1980s, half
of households headed by someone under the age of 25 had less than $746 in financial assets
and 19 percent had no financial assets at all. Half of households headed by someone between
25 and 34 had less than $1514 in financial assets and 13 percent had none (Survey of
Consumer Finances 1984). Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not available to finance
on-the-job training and banks will not lend money for this purpose without collateral.
Studies of the willingness of consumers to substitute consumption over time find that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is no higher than one and most studies conclude it is .5 or
below (Friend and Blume 1975; Hall 1988; Hubbard and Judd 1986). A substitution elasticity of
.5 implies that reducing a liquidity constrained worker's wage by one half (in order to pay for
general training) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal utility of current consumption. Where
significant general training is occurring, the liquidity constraints faced by many workers result in
an employment contract in which employer share the costs of general training.
When the worker stays at the firm, the effect of increased general training on wage
growth is given by the total derivative:
17) ¶(W2K-W1K) = 1 + Cg – [1 + daPr(SK)][q(1-b) + ¶M ¶db¶C] < 1 + Cg
                      ¶g                                                              ¶db ¶C ¶g
When a worker leaves after training, the effect of increased general training is:
17’)  ¶(W2j¹K-W1K) = b + Cg – [daPr(SK)][q (1-b) + ¶M ¶db ¶C] < 1+ Cg
                                ¶g                                                         ¶db ¶C ¶g
where M = the second two terms of equation 15 or {q[Qa + Qb] + (da-db)W2}
                                                                                                       dags +dbgK
¶M/¶db  < 0,       ¶db/¶C < 0,      ¶C/¶g > 0
General training raises productivity net of training costs by 1 + Cg. Equation 17 tells us that the
wage growth impact of general training is smaller than this for two reasons:
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· Technically general skills cannot be accurately signaled, so general training raises wage
rates on the external labor market by less than it raises productivity (b < 1). This means that
the training firm does not need to raise the second period wage of trained workers as much
as would be required if b = 1.
· Most young workers are liquidity constrained and are unable or unwilling to finance large
investments in general training. The bigger the investment in general training, the bigger the
necessary reduction in starting wage rates investments if workers are to pay for it. This
causes bb, the worker's valuation of income received in the future, to fall and this shifts the
degree of front loading in the optimal employment contract.
A comparison of 17 and 17' leads to the conclusion that wage effects of general training will
be larger when the worker leaves the firm, if b = 1 or is very close to 1.
Summary
a) When employers cannot accurately measure the amount and quality of general OJT that
job applicants have received from other employers (B < 1), workers tend to reduce their
investment in general OJT and employers pay some of the incremental costs of
investment in technically general OJT. Thus an increase in technically general training
causes productivity to rise more rapidly than wage rates. The level of investment in
general OJT that results and response to improvements in the quality of the signals of
general OJT depends on both discount rates, the separation rate, the proportion of
marginal investments in general OJT that are perceived by other employers and the
response of turnover to marginal increases in the quality of general training that are not
accurately perceived by other employers.
b) When elasticities of labor supply are greater for new hires than for trained workers with
more than a year or so of tenure at the firm, the time pattern of compensation will reflect
the relative rate at which employers and workers discount future earnings. The young
workers who need general training the most would face ruinous increases in their
borrowing rates if they tried to borrow to finance large investments in general training.
Employers with jobs offering substantial investments in general training compete for
these workers by offering a flatter wage profile than is implied by a simple application of
general OJT theory.
c) Anything that contributes to the specificity of the match tends to lower the second period
wage below worker productivity and raises the first period wage by a compensating
amount. Training in firm specific skills is one cause of specificity. Another four are
identified: damaged reputation from being fired or quitting, the costs of finding another
job, the improvement in the average productivity of the remaining workers that results
from dismissing the least productive, and the sorting effect that results from the exit of
those with the best alternative opportunities and those who dislike their current job.
d) Consequently, relative rates of growth of wages and productivity in the first year of
tenure depend on so many factors, who pays for training (in the sense of HYP 1 and 3)
cannot be determined by comparing average rates of wage and productivity growth.
The Costs and Benefits of General Training                                                                                                                   WP 96-19
Page 17
We now turn to empirical evidence testing these predictions.
III. Wages Are Often Not Appreciably Lower during General Training
Many employers violate the prediction that wages must be lowered while general training
is underway.
3.1 Employer Sponsored Computer Training at Temporary Help Agencies
Most large organizations offer free training in generic computer applications programs
such as MS Word, Word Perfect and Excel. Even temporary help agencies provide such training
to their workers. Alan Krueger's (1993) survey of 83 temporary employment agencies found that
59 percent of them provided free up-front computer training for the workers they place. Training
costs were shared: the worker committed her time and the agency provided an instructor and
training facilities. The agencies were willing to share general training costs because secretaries
proficient in word processing generated substantially higher weekly fees when placed and the
worker received only half of the increment.
3.2 Employer Sponsored Workplace Literacy Programs
A small but growing number of firms are training their workers in completely general
skills such as mathematics, reading, writing, problem solving and interpersonal skills. Based on
a telephone survey that achieved a remarkably good 66 percent response rate, Laurie Bassi
(1992) has estimated that 10 percent of manufacturing firms with fewer than 500 employees and
8 percent of similarly sized non-manufacturing firms offered such training at the work site and
provided at least partial release time for participation. Hollenbeck and Anderson's (1992) survey
of Michigan firms with workplace literacy programs also found that most (81 percent) gave their
workers released time when they participated in the training. The National Household Education
Survey found that less than one percent of all workers had participated in a workplace literacy
program in 1991, but those that did spent an average of 80 hours in the program. One-third of
participants said it was required by their employer, 54 percent said they were given time off to
attend and 49 percent said the costs of the training were paid by their company (Hollenbeck
1993b).
The fact that many companies required worker participation indicates that literacy
training is not a new form of untaxed compensation. Indeed one of the reasons why some
companies do not offer such training is a concern that workers will feel demeaned by a
suggestion that they need to improve their reading and arithmetic skills. To avoid such a
reaction, the basic skills training is often integrated with workplace technical training. The word
literacy is never used (Mikulecky 1989). Companies with such programs believe the training has
raised morale, company loyalty, communication on the job, teamwork, quality of output,
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productivity and customer satisfaction (Bassi 1992 Table 11A). Clearly, some companies feel
strongly enough about the need for their workers to improve these general skills, they were
willing to pick up most of the costs of developing skills which are highly useful at other
companies and in everyday life.
3.3 Cross-section Studies of Starting Wage Rates
The worker "pays all the costs of general training" hypothesis also fails tests conducted
in large representative data sets. Training typically develops both specific and general skills so
jobs that offer a lot of training should have lower wages. Most studies, however, fail to confirm
this prediction.
In a study of 1979 to 1982 wage rates of recent school leavers in the National
Longitudinal Survey, Parson's (1985, table 7.6) found that when "the skills [I am] learning would
be valuable in getting a better job," was reported to be "very true", the job paid on average 2.4
to 14 percent more than when the respondent reported the above statement was "not at all true"
even when an extensive set of controls for schooling and academic achievement were included
in the model.
Lynch's (1992) analysis of 1983 NLSY data found that, controlling on occupation,
industry, tenure, experience, schooling and background characteristics, workers who were in
the 20th week of an incomplete spell of on-the-job training were paid a significant 5.2 percent
extra on average. Patrice Flynn's (1990) analysis of monthly earnings data in the Survey of
Income and Program Participation found, that controlling for size of establishment, tenure,
experience, schooling, previous training and demographic background (but not occupation),
those currently receiving employer provided training earned a statistically significant 5.7 percent
less on average. Lillard and Tan's (1986, Table 4.3-4.5) analysis of NLS Young Mens data and
Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989, Table 2) analysis of EOPP data found no significant
tendency for wages to be lower while training is underway. Point estimates were negative but so
small they might as well be zero from a substantive point of view.
Barron, Berger and Black's (1993a, Table 1) cross section analysis of the SBA financed
employer survey found that doubling on-the-job training intensity lowered the starting wage rate
by a significant 2 to 4 percent. Doubling the off-site training intensity, however, was associated
with a 4 percent higher wage. Even where training is associated with lower wage rates, the
magnitude of the effect appears to be much too small to be consistent with standard theory.
Another test of the "employee pays all" hypothesis can be conducted in the 1984 follow
up of the High School and Beyond seniors. This survey contains the necessary data on the
training received in the current or most recent job and an extensive array of worker
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characteristics that can be used to control for the skills and ability of the worker. Becker's
prediction was tested by regressing the log of the deflated starting wage of the current or most
recent job on indicators of the receipt of employer sponsored training while controlling for an
array of background characteristics. The coefficients on the training variables and statistics
describing the overall fit of the model are presented in Table 1. Contrary to Becker's prediction,
the jobs offering some training rather than none or which offer greater amounts of training paid
higher starting wage rates even when a whole array of human capital characteristics were
controlled. For females the positive effect of receiving training on the starting wage was
statistically significant. Adding dummies for occupation and industry did not change the results
appreciably.
It can be argued, however, that these findings do not constitute a decisive refutation of
the proposition that workers pay all of the costs of general training and share the costs of
specific training. Maybe the anomalous findings are caused by unobserved heterogeneity. The
argument is that hiring decision makers are better at assessing the ability of job candidates than
econometricians with access to NLS or HSB data file and the positive association between
wages and training arises because workers who are highly able (in ways not observed by the
econometrician) are both paid more and also recruited for jobs that are more complex and that
consequently require large amounts of training.
Unobserved heterogeneity no doubt has the effect of contributing to the positive
association between training and starting wage rates, but to transform a large negative
structural relationship into either zero impacts or statistically significant positive relationships,
sorting of more able job applicants into high training jobs would have to be very powerful
indeed. If such a selection process were operating, access to training should depend on ability
factors that are visible to the analyst as well as on factors that are not visible to the analyst. Yet
models predicting training participation shortly after leaving school estimated by Parsons (1985)
failed to find large effects of ability proxies such as test scores on the probability of receiving
training.
The results of another test of this hypothesis in the High School and Beyond data are
presented in Table 2. The dependent variables in the analysis were a dummy variable for
having received some employer sponsored training and the trainee's estimate of the total
number of hours that were spent in training. The ability proxies hypothesized to have a positive
effect on the receipt of training were: test scores, GPA, grades in vocational courses,
deportment in school, number of vocational courses, number of academic courses, hours spent
doing homework, hours spent working for pay, number of leadership roles, having an internal
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locus of control (the belief that one controls one's own fate), an index of reading in high school,
and a positive response to "do you enjoy working for pay." Variables hypothesized to have a
negative effect on the receipt of training were: did not graduate, hours watching TV, and self-
reported study habit problems. The model estimated also included controls for tenure on the job
and its square, race, hispanic, marital status, 5 variables describing college enrollment since
high school, parental education, occupation and income, number of siblings, urban/rural
dummies, and a set of ten dummies for region.
Despite reasonably large samples--1938 men and 2554 women--, the analysis offers
only limited support for the hypothesized positive association between ability proxies measured
in high school and the receipt of training three to four years later. Only two of 18 variables
thought to proxy for ability/productivity had significant coefficients of the correct sign in two or
more of the 4 regressions: average weekly hours worked for pay during the junior and senior
year of high school and the intervening summer and the number of vocational courses taken in
the final three years of high school. Of the 72 coefficients tested, only 42 had the hypothesized
sign. Of the 11 coefficients significant at the 5 percent level on a two tail test, three had the
wrong sign.
Of possibly the greatest significance is the failure of high school grades and test scores
to have the expected effect on the receipt of training. Industrial psychologists have found strong
positive relationships between success in training and test scores and a somewhat weaker
positive relationship between training success and GPA (Hunter, Crossen and Friedman, 1985).
Consequently, one would expect employers to seek out such workers for jobs requiring a great
deal of training. This does not appear to be the case in this sample for high school GPA had a
negative effect on receipt of training in three of the ,four regressions. One coefficient was
significantly positive, but there were also two negative coefficients that were also significant (at
the 10 percent level on a two tail test). Only one of the eight coefficients on dummies for good
grades in vocational subjects was statistically significant. Half of the coefficients on test score
were negative.
When filling jobs that require training, employers appear to try to economize on training
costs by seeking out workers who have already received some training either on a job or in
school. In other respects, however, their selections do not appear to be optimal for they fail to
recruit the high school graduates with the strongest academic records and/or with high test
scores. Parsons obtained similar results when he estimated models predicting which members
of his sample had obtained "high learning" jobs. Given these findings, it is hard to imagine how
selection on ability factors that are not proxied by High School and Beyond or NLS variables
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could be strong enough to transform a large negative effect of training on the starting wage in
the true structural model into a positive association in this data set.
Once workers have been out of school for many years, the situation changes. The more
able workers have proved themselves to their employers and rewards for cognitive ability-- both
higher wages and better training opportunities-- appear to become more substantial. Bartel and
Sicherman (1993) and Veum's (1993) analysis of 1986 to 1990 NLSY data found that workers
with high 1980 test scores were considerably more likely to receive company training and to be
sent to seminars. Unfortunately, these analyses do not control for occupation and industry, so
some of the positive relationship uncovered may be due to occupational choice.
3.4 Wages do not Decline When Workers Enter Training
Another way to control for heterogeneity is to follow workers over time and assess
whether entering a training program lowers wage growth. Lowenstein and Spletzer's (1994
Table 4) study provides separate estimates of the effect of complete and incomplete training
spells on wage growth. They found that those in the midst of incomplete spells of training did not
suffer wage declines relative to those who received no training during the previous year. Paul
Langermann's (1996a, 1996b) studies of NLSY data also found no statistically significant
reductions in wage rates for those receiving training.
3.5 Impact of Training Requirement Differentials on Relative Wage Rates
One possibility is that unobserved heterogeneity problem is really across jobs not across
people. Jobs that offer a lot of training might have other undesirable characteristics such as long
hours. Assistant professors and Junior Associates at law firms come to mind. Therefore, let us
hold the job constant and examine whether workers who require extra training are paid less by
an amount equal to the additional training costs they impose on the firm. Workers hired for the
same job often have different amounts of relevant work experience and so require different
amounts of training. Who pays for the additional costs of training an inexperienced worker? Are
workers who require extra training forced to accept much reduced starting wage rates?  Or does
the employer bear most of the additional costs, hoping to recoup these costs by limiting the
wage increase after the completion of training?
Bishop (1987) presents an empirical analysis of EOPP data which addresses this
question. He regressed the difference between the starting wage rates of two new hires for the
same job on differences in their productivity and training time requirements. Workers who
required extra training time were offered lower starting wage rates, but the effect was small.
Holding productivity outcomes constant, workers who received 100 extra hours of training
during the first 3 months on the job were paid 3.3 percent less both at the start and after one
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year or so on the job. Barron, Berger and Black (1993a Table 4) analysis of SBA data obtained
similar results. Even though about a third of the new hires received more or less training than
was typical for the job, wage rates differed from the typical level only 6 percent of the time.
3.6 Is Most Training Firm Specific?
Another possible explanation of these anomalous findings is that almost all training is
specific and employers finance all of its costs. Standard models of the sharing of the costs of
specific training do not predict that employers pay all of its costs and some of the revisionist
theories [e.g. Salop and Salop's (1976) adverse selection theory] predict that employers pay
none of the costs of specific training.3 There is also direct evidence that most training is general.
Employers in the EOPP survey were asked, "How many of the skills learned by new employees
in this job are useful outside this company?" Fifty-nine percent responded "almost all," 13
percent responded "most." Only 7.5 percent answered "almost none."
On the other hand, different firms require different mixes of general skills. The training
firm concentrates on the skills it needs, some of which may not be valued by alternative
employers. A particular employer may expect its employees to use Word Perfect for word
processing, Lotus 1-2-3 for spreadsheets and Harvard Graphics for presentations. Other firms in
the area may have selected a different mix of software packages for their firm, so while
familiarity with each of these packages is a general skill, only a few firms may use the same mix
of software applications. Thus, the package of general skills workers develop will generally be
more valuable at the training firm than at other firms even when each individual skill is correctly
perceived to be useful elsewhere.
The mix problem is certainly part of the explanation of the weak wage response to easily
signaled general skills. One should not, however, exaggerate its importance. Lotus 1-2-3
experts can learn Excel very easily. Since the office suite market is now dominated by just two
programs, other firms that value one's spreadsheet skills are easy to find.
IV. Impacts of Company Training on Wage Growth
when Workers leave the Training Firm
Employers who share the costs of general training because liquidity constrained
employees are unable or unwilling to finance general training will naturally expect to share the
                                                 
3 In the adverse selection models of Salop and Salop (1976) and Nickell (1976) workers have information not available to firms
on how likely they are to quit, so since turnover is costly, some employers attempt to attract those with low quit probabilities by
imposing a hiring fee (through a below market starting wage) and raising the wage level in subsequent periods. The equilibrium
wage pattern results in the worker paying all the costs and receiving all the benefits of investments in specific human capital and
in wage rates which rise in step with gains in productivity net of training costs.
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benefits during the post training period. Consequently, the wage increase they offer their
trainees should be smaller than is available if the worker takes the new skills to another firm. If,
however, trained workers are less productive at other firms because some of their skills are
technically or behaviorally (b < 1) specific to the training firm, the wage effects of training will be
larger for those who stay at the firm. Only the training firm is willing to offer a wage premium for
skills developed in training that are technically or behaviorally specific to the firm.
Therefore, the impact of turnover on the wage growth effects of training provide evidence
on how important the liquidity constraint explanation of employer sharing of general training
costs and benefits is relative to the imperfect signaling and skills are specific explanation. Two
separate analyses of NLSY data have found evidence that supports the importance of the
liquidity constraint motive for sharing training investments. Lowenstein and Spletzer (1994)
found that wage effects of training were larger when workers switched employers after training.
Paul Lengermann's (1996b) analysis of 1979 to 1993 NLSY data found that company training
programs lasting more than 4 weeks had long lasting effects on wage rates that were larger
when workers switched employers (12.1 percent after 6 years, F=6.38) than when they stayed
at the training firm (4.6 percent after 6 years, F=4.98).
V. Wage and Productivity Impacts of General Training
In this section, we examine how the amount of time devoted to training new hires at a
firm influences the rate at which their productivity and wage rates grow.
An employer survey sponsored by the National Institute of Education and the National
Center for Research in Vocational Education conducted between February and June 1982 is a
good data set for testing hypotheses regarding relative rates of wages and productivity growth.4
Each employer was asked a series of questions about "the last new employee your company
hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether that person is still employed by your company."
One-third of the employees selected in this manner were blue collar workers, 18 percent were
service workers, 15 percent were sales workers and 23 percent were clerical workers. Eleven
percent had fewer than 12 years of schooling, 62 percent had exactly 12 years of schooling and
27 percent had more than 12. Forty-two percent of the respondents managed establishments
                                                                                                                                                    
4 The survey was the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers located in 28 groups of counties
scattered around the country. The sample was drawn from lists of establishments paying unemployment insurance taxes that
were stratified by size and industry. Because the original survey was designed to evaluate the labor market effects of welfare
reform proposals, both large establishments and establishments in industries with a high proportions of low wage workers were
over sampled. The sample under represents workers who are employed at large establishments. The second wave attempted to
conduct a telephone interview with all the respondents in the first-wave survey and achieved a 70 percent response rate.
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with fewer than 10 employees and 70 percent of them had fewer than 50 employees. Most of
these respondents were responsible for setting the wage rates of their employees and hence
were familiar with their job performance record.
The 1982 EOPP employer survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate
supervisor) to report on productivity of the typicalindividual hired in the job after two weeks,
during the next 11 weeks and at the end of two years at the firm. The rating was made on a
"scale of zero to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees
in (NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by your employee." For
the full data set at the mean values of these indexes of reported productivity were 51.9 during
the first two weeks, 66.6 during the next 11 weeks and 79.4 at the time of the interview (or
during the last week for those who left). The questions asking for a rating of the productivity of
particular workers had a nonresponse rate of only 4.4 percent. Comparably defined
nonresponse rates for other questions were 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 3.2
percent for age, 6.7 percent for education, 8.6 percent for time spent in informal training by
supervisor, and 5.7 percent for a three-question sequence from which starting wage rate is
calculated. The low-nonresponse rate implies that our respondents felt that they were capable
of making such judgments and augur well for the quality of the data that results.
The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired employees do not
measure productivity in any absolute sense and therefore are not comparable across firms or
across jobs in a firm. Rather, they are intended as ratio scale indicators of the relative
productivity of a typical (or a particular) worker at different points in their tenure at a firm. Under
an assumption that these productivity indexes are proportional transformations of true
productivity plus a random error, percentage differences in cell means of the productivity index
will be unbiased estimators of percentage differences in true productivity. If the variations in the
productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true
productivity, our estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be
biased upward. Even though it is possible for a worker's true productivity to be negative, the
scale was defined as having a lower limit of zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause
measurement errors to be negatively correlated with the true value. If this is the case, then our
estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased
downward. This latter type of bias appears to be more likely than the former.
Further evidence that the proportionality assumption results in an understatement of
proportionate productivity differences across people in the same job or with different amounts of
tenure comes from comparing the coefficients of variation of productivity in this and other data
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sets. If pairs of workers who are still at the firm are used to construct a coefficient of variation for
this data set, it averages .13 for sales clerks, clerical, service and blue collar workers. This
estimate of the coefficient of variation is smaller than the estimates of the coefficient of variation
for yearly output derived from analysis of objective ratio scale measures of output. These
estimates were .35 for sales clerks, .144 for semi-skilled blue collar workers, .28 in craft jobs,
.164 for workers in routine clerical jobs and .278 in clerical jobs with decision making
responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). This means that the estimates of the
effect of training on productivity growth reported in this paper are probably conservative.
The survey distinguished four types of employer-provided training: (1) formal training
(provided by a training professional), (2) time spent watching others do the job, (3) informal
on-the-job training by supervisors, and (4) informal on-the-job training by co-workers. An index
of training intensity was constructed by first valuing trainer and trainee time relative to that of
workers with two years of tenure in that job and then combining the time invested in training
activities during the first three months on the job. The employers reported that workers with two
years of tenure were about 25 percent more productive than new hires during their first three
months on the job.5 The management staff members who provide formal and informal training
were assumed to be paid 1.5 times the wage of coworkers. Formal training involves four kinds
of costs: development costs, facility costs, trainer time and trainee time. Sometimes, it is
one-on-one and sometimes it is done in groups but since most of the establishments in this
study are small, class size was probably small as well. Consequently, it was assumed that when
all the costs of formal training other than the trainee's time are lumped together- evelopment
costs, training materials costs and the value of the trainer's time-- they are about 25 percent
greater than the time costs of the trainee.6 When supervisors and coworkers are giving informal
training to a new employee, the trainee is almost invariably directly involved in a production
activity. Employers report that for informal training, the trainees are typically as productive while
being trained as they are when working alone (Hollenbeck and Smith 1984). Consequently,
                                                 
5 The use of the ratio to estimate the relative productivity implicitly involves an assumption that the productivity reports received
from employers are a proportional transformation of true productivity plus a random error. The unknown factor of proportionality
can be different for every job, every firm and every respondent but a single respondent is assumed to use the same
proportionality factor when answering initial and later productivity. If alternatively it were assumed that experienced workers are
50 percent more productive than new hires in their first three months estimates of training investment would be 7 to 15 percent
lower.
6 When many workers can be trained simultaneously, the fixed costs of developing the training package and hiring a trainer are
spread over a larger number of trainees. This means that the average hourly cost of formal training is generally smaller at large
companies than small companies. For the small companies included in this study was assumed that the cost factor for formal
training was roughly 1.8 times the value of an experienced coworker's time. For establishments with more than 200 employees,
cost factors for formal training would be much lower, possibly between 1.2 and 1.4.
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informal training was assumed to involve only the investment of the trainer's time. Training
intensity for the first 3 months expressed in units of the time of trained workers has an arithmetic
mean of 149 hours and a geometric mean of 76 hours.
The impact of training on productivity and wage growth of specific recently hired workers
and typical new hires was estimated by regressing productivity growth during the first year or so
on training intensity during the first three months, the duration of training and a vector of control
variables. The specifications were as follows:
(18) P2YR – P2WK = BX + b1lnL + b2InT + b3(lnT)
2 + b4S
glnT + b4SlnT + u
(19) PiCUR – P i2WK = BX + B’Z1 + b1lnL + b2lnT + b3(lnT)
2 + b4S
glnT + bbSlnT + u
(20) WiCUR  - Wi2WK = AX + A’Z1 + a1lnL +  a2lnT + a3(lnT)2 + a4SglnT + a5SlnT + u
P2YR = Productivity of the typical worker at the end of 2 years. In the logarithmic models the
variable is the logarithm of the productivity rating plus 5. In the linear models the
productivity variables are the productivity rating on the 0 to 100 scale divided by 79.4,
the mean current productivity rating for the new hires and for typical new hires with 2
years of tenure.
P2WK = Productivity of the typical worker during the first 2 weeks.
WiCUR, Wi2WK = Current and Starting wage rates of the "i"th new hire.
X = a vector of job and firm characteristics (B s a vector of coefficients)
Zi = a vector of human capital characteristics of the "i"th new hire
InL = logarithm of the required length of training
T = Training Intensity is a weighted sum of the four different types of training received by typical
new hires where the weight reflect the assumed costliness of this form of training.
T = 1.8 *TF + 1.5 *Td + Tc + .8 *TW
TF = Hours devoted to formal training during the first 3 months ('00s).
Td = Hours spent in informal training b y supervisors during the first 3 months ('00s).
Tc = Hours spent in informal training by coworkers during the first 3 months ('00s).
T'W= Hours spent training by watching others do the work during the first 3 months('00s).
S = a vector of shares of training that are formal, watching others, and informal OJT by
co-workers. The excluded category is informal OJT by managers and supervisors. (e.g.
SF = 1.8TF/T)
Sg = the proportion of the skills learned useful at other firms.
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To test for diminishing returns, both training variables were logged and the square of
training intensity was also included in the model. Productivity growth during the first 2 years was
defined in 2 different ways. Table 3 presents our results when the dependent variables are
logarithms of productivity growth and wage growth. Table 3A presents the results when the
productivity growth variable is the change in productivity ratings on a 0-100 scale divided by
79.4 and the wage growth variable is the dollar and cents increase in wage rate divided by
$5.96, the mean of the current wage. The models contained controls for the characteristics of
the new hire, the occupation, SVP, and GED of the job, percent of craft workers and percent of
skilled workers at the firm, the cost of machinery used in the job, unionization, importance of
vocational training in selection, percentage of the firm's work force under age 25, and reported
difficulty in finding reliable unskilled workers.
The first two columns of Table 3 and 3A present models predicting the log of the ratio of
typical productivity at two years of tenure to productivity during the first two weeks on the job for
the typical new hire. Columns 3-6 of Table 3 and 3A present results using productivity and wage
growth data on a particular new hire rather than a typical new hire. Missing data reduces sample
sizes by about 100. R squares of the models are slightly higher, however, because
characteristics of the worker and the worker's tenure at the time of the interview are included in
the structural model of productivity growth. In order to minimize simultaneity problems, the
training variables used in these models were for a typical new hire rather than for that particular
new hire. Comparisons of columns 1 and 2 with 3 and 4 reveal that the estimated impacts of
training are quite similar for these two specifications.
Interactions between Skill Generality and Training
Theory predicts that the more general the training, the greater will be the share of
training costs that is paid by the new employee and the resulting rate of wage growth. The effect
of skill generality on the marginal productivity of training is not predictable by a priori reasoning.
Turnover causes specific training to lose value more rapidly than general training. Since it has a
longer payoff period, general training will be profitable even when its immediate impact on job
performance is smaller than specific training's immediate impact. On the other hand, general
training is supposed to be financed by workers not firms. Workers cannot borrow at as low
interest rates as firms, so workers will require very high payoffs if they are to be induced to
make the investment. This has the opposite implication. The inability of workers to finance
general training may reduce such investment and drive up marginal payoffs to such investment.
The relative importance of these two effects can be tested by interacting training
intensity with a measure of the proportion of skills that are general (Sg). The first, third and fifth
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columns of Table 3 and 3A report results of models of productivity and wage growth that test
such an interaction. The coefficients on the training type interactions (vector b5) have been
constrained to be zero. These models provide evidence on the effect of skill generality on the
wage impacts and the marginal product of training. The results suggest that general skills cause
the wage effects of training to increase. The interaction coefficient is significant in the linear
specification. In the productivity growth models, however, the generality of training has no
impact on the marginal productivity of training. The two effects discussed above have offset
each other. Apparently, the difficulties workers face in financing general training are as severe a
barrier to investment in general training as high separation rates are to investments in specific
training.
Comparing Productivity and Wage Impacts of Training
The calculated impact of increases in weighted training intensity from 10 to 100 hours,
from 100 to 200 hours and from 200 and 300 hours are tabulated at the bottom of Table 3 and
3A. The first, third and fifth columns are estimates of the impact when training is completely
general. In the logarithmic specification, the proportionate productivity increase was .226/.202
for the move from 10 to 100 hours, .134/.115 for increases from 100 to 200 hours and .093/.079
for increases from 200 to 300 hours (double the mean). Wage increases were substantially
smaller .0331 for the 10 to 100 hours change and .0146 for the 200 to 300 hours change.
The linear specification generates substantially lower estimates of the impact of training
on productivity and slightly lower estimates of the wage response. As before, the wage effects
of general training are smaller than productivity effects. The length of training, for example, has
highly significant effects on productivity growth but not on wage growth. Thus both the
logarithmic and linear specification produce results that are inconsistent with the
proposition that general training has larger effects on wage growth than productivity
growth.
It should also be noted that even in the linear specification, the proportionate increases
in productivity generated by an extra 100 hours of training are quite large relative to their cost--
about 5 percent of an experienced worker's productivity during a year.7
                                                 
7 It must be remembered that the productivity payoff to training must include cash flows that compensate for turnover and
obsolescence as well the time value of money. Lillard and Tan (1986), for example, have estimated that training depreciates at
15 to 20 percent per year due to obsolescence and turnover. This implies that equilibrium in the training market is likely require
that the initial increments in productivity generated by a training program be at least 25 percent of the costs of program.
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The Impact of Who does the Training
The second, fourth and sixth columns allow us to test for training type interactions while
constraining b4, the general training interaction, to be zero. The positive and significant
coefficient on interactions between intensity of training and the share that is formal training,
coworker training or watching others do the work implies that these forms of training have
significantly larger effects on productivity growth than OJT by supervisors, the excluded training
category. The wage impacts of training are significantly larger for formal training and watching
others than for training by managers and coworkers. Formal training is easier to signal to other
employers, so the finding of larger wage rate responses to this type of training is easy to
understand.
Co-worker training is very effective at increasing productivity, but it has only small
effects on wage rates. Apparently, the importance of OJT provided by co-workers is
underestimated by all concerned, the employee, the supervisor, and other employers.
Results Using Instrumental Variables in EOPP Data
The discussion so far has assumed that the causation runs from training to productivity
growth. It might be argued that when one is examining relationships for a typical worker that
firms hiring workers with very low initial productivity will find it profitable to provide more than
average amounts of training. Consequently, when initial productivity is not controlled, there may
be simultaneity bias in our models. A second econometric problem that is likely to be effecting
the results is errors in measuring training. Measurement error is probably biasing down our
estimates of the effect of training on productivity growth. To test for these biases, we estimated
the model of productivity growth using instrumented values of training rather than the actual
training investments.
The determinants of training investment were divided into two categories: those that
theory predicts directly influence productivity growth and those which influence the cost of
training without directly affecting rates of productivity growth conditional on training. The
variables in this latter category were the number of alternative employers, dummies for industry,
the growth rate of employment, the growth rate of sales, the number of employees at the
establishment, the size of firm, the wage rate, a dummy for wage at or below the minimum
wage, a dummy for temporary job, dummies for no probationary period, the log of length of the
probationary period, dummies for not knowing if there is a probationary period, a measure of the
difficulty of firing a worker after the probationary period is ended, a measure of the importance
of seniority in determining who is laid off, and characteristics of the local labor market. These
variables were used as instruments for the training variables. This involves maintaining the
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hypothesis that these variables influence the cost of training investments, and therefore, the
level and composition of training without influencing the rate at which new employees learn. The
X variables assumed to have direct impacts on productivity growth were the variables that were
controls in the analysis reported in tables 3 and 3A. They included dummies for occupation, the
specific vocational preparation (SVP), and the general educational development (GED) that the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) specified is necessary for the job, percent of work force
skilled, percent of work force who are crafts workers, the importance of vocational education in
selection, cost of machinery, unionization, hours worked per week, and characteristics of the
hires (i.e., percent under age 25), and an employer response that it is hard to find reliable
unskilled workers. When outcomes for particular individuals were being modeled, the new hires'
education, sex, relevant prior work experience and tenure were included in the structural model.
This analysis employs a linear specification for both the outcome variables and training
intensity:
(21) P iCUR – Pi2WK = AX + A’Z + a1lnL + a2T + a3T
2 + u
The results from a variety of specifications are reported in table 4. In the OLS models,
the first 100 hours of training raise productivity of typical workers by 10 percent and wage rates
by 2.5 percent. For particular new hires, the first 100 hours of training raises productivity 9.3
percent and raises wage rates 2 percent. A doubling of the length of training raises productivity
by 1.8 percent and wage rates by .6 percent.
In most cases, estimating by instrumental variables (IV) increases the magnitude of
coefficients, but reduces their statistical significance. The IV results also reverse the sign of the
coefficient on length of training. The fact that IV estimations increase rather than reduce
estimated effects of training intensity suggests that measurement error bias is more serious
than simultaneity bias. The IV findings also support the conclusion that training has larger
proportionate effects on productivity than on wage rates.
Analysis of NFIB Data
The second data set to be analyzed comes from a survey of a stratified random sample
of the 500,000 members of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) conducted
during the first half of 1987. Salaried managers in charge of subunits of large publicly owned
corporations are not eligible for membership in NFIB, so the sample does not contain data on
employment outcomes at large multi-establishment firms. Despite over sampling NFIB members
with many employees, most of the firms were very small. The geometric mean for employment
was 12.4. A four page questionnaire was mailed to approximately 11,000 firms, and after 3
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follow up waves, 2599 responses were obtained. Another 569 firms returned questionnaires
saying they did not have any employees.
The questionnaire focussed on the owner's experiences in hiring and training two
workers for a particular job. This job was selected by asking: "For which job have you hired the
most people over the last two or three years. (If you have more than one job for which you have
done a lot of hiring, please select the job requiring the greatest skill.) “All future questions
refer to this job." After a series of general questions about the character of the job, the owner
was asked to select two individuals who had been hired for this job and answer all future
questions specifically with reference to those two workers. The selection was made in response
to the following question:
Please think of the last person hired for this job (job X) by your firm prior
to August 1986 regardless of whether that person is still employed by your
firm. Call this individual person A. The individual hired for job X
immediately before person A is called person B. Do not include rehires of
former employees.
Owners were asked both about starting wages and initial productivity at the beginning of the
second week of employment and about current wage rates and current productivity. If one or
both of the new hires had left the firm prior to the date of completing the questionnaire, the
owner was asked to provide information on the circumstances which prevailed "at the time of
separation." Information of varying degrees of completeness were obtained on 1624 person A's
and 1403 person B's. The data on person A and B were stacked producing a sample of 1685
workers with data on productivity and wage growth. Non response to particular questions
reduced the sample further to 1242.
The constraints of a mail questionnaire forced a simplification of questions about time
devoted to training. Whereas the EOPP questionnaire distinguished formal from informal, and
informal training from supervisors from informal training by coworkers, all three of these forms of
training were combined in one very short question: "How many hours did you or an employee
spend training or closely supervising A or B?" Two other types of training investment were
distinguished. The questions were: "How many additional hours (beyond training and close
supervision) did A/B spend learning the job by watching others ra  than doing it?" and "How
many hours did A/B spend reading manuals, etc. in order to learn the job?" Owners were asked
to complete this question for the "first week" of employment and for the "next six months."8 The
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, respondents were not told what to do when they felt unable to estimate the time devoted to training. The result
was that it was often not clear whether a blank response should be coded as a zero or as a don't know. The following decision
rules were adopted. Responses of "Continuous," "DK" and "?" were coded as missing. If the employer had entered a "0" or
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logarithm of the total number of hours spent in the three forms of training over the six month
period was used as the training variable.
The following models were estimated:
(22) (PiCUR – Pi1WK)/ P
iAvg
  = BX + B’ZI + b1lnT + b4(1-S
g)lnT + u
(23) (WiCUR – Wi1WK)/W
iAvg = AX + A’Z1 + a1lnT + a2(1-Sg)lnT + u
(24) [PiCUR – Pi1WK]/P
iAvg – [WiCUR – Wi1WK]/W
iAvg = CX + C’Z1 + c1lnT + c2(1-S
g)lnT + u’
where
P iAvg, WiAvg = Average for the "i"th worker of initial and current levels of productivity and wages.
The results are presented in Table 5. The X v ctor of firm characteristics includes a set
of dummies for occupation, individual incentive pay, group incentive pay, four indicators of skill
requirements, cost of the equipment used by the employee, perceived accuracy of performance
evaluations, importance of six traits for success on the job. The Z1 vector of individual
characteristics includes: tenure and its square, gender, race, Hispanic, whether married,
schooling, relevant occupational schooling, six dummies for sources of relevant training prior to
being hired, age and age squared, relevant experience and its square, and 5 dummy variables
describing the recruitment/selection process.
The first column of the table gives the our estimates of the impact of general training on
productivity growth, wage growth and the difference between the rates of productivity and wage
growth. General training has significant effects on productivity growth. General training also
causes productivity to grow at a substantially higher rate than wage rates. The differential is
highly significant. The model was also estimated by two-stage least squares.9 The finding that
training affects productivity more than wage rates replicates in the 2SLS analysis.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Becker's statement that the employee must always pay the full costs of general on--
the-job training is apparently not necessarily true. Our analysis of High School Beyond data
                                                                                                                                                    
"none" for one category of training and left others categories blank, blanks were coded as missing. If the employer had not
answered the question about productivity at the end of six months, all training questions about the six months period following
the first week were coded as missing. Otherwise, a blank was coded as zero. This procedure probably errs on the side of
retaining observations that should have been dropped and this lowers calculated means for the sample. The resulting means for
the first week on the job were 18.4 hours for trainer time, 5.7 hours for watching others and 3.5 hours for reading manuals. For
the next six months the means were 54.6 hours for trainer time, 20.9 hours for watching others and 12.0 hours for reading
manuals.
9 Besides the personal and firm characteristics listed above that appear in the productivity and wage growth regression, the first
stage regression predicting the level of training included: dummies for industry, log establishment size and its square, turnover
rate and its square, a dummy indicating the job was a temporary one, the proportion of skills useful at other firms, the number of
other local firms that employ workers with the skills learned on this job and 5 indicators of the perceived accuracy of its
judgements of worker abilities prior to making hiring decisions.
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found that wage rates are not lower in jobs that offer large amounts of employer training. The
analyses of EOPP and NFIB employer surveys concluded that general training does not have
bigger effects on wage growth than productivity growth as predicted by the simple OJT model.
These findings are not inconsistent with theory, only very simplistic theory. We show that when
realistic assumptions are made about the imperfect signaling of technically general skills and
liquidity constraints faced by young workers (combined with quit and dismissal elasticities that
are substantially below infinity), theory's predictions change. Optimal employment contracts
often have the employer sharing the costs and benefits of increases in technically general
training.
The theoretical analysis presented in section 2 should be seen as an existence proof,
not an exhaustive analysis of the reasons why employers and workers choose employment
contracts in which employers share the costs and benefits of technically general training in .the
sense of HYP 1, 2 and 3. We can think of four other factors that might have similar effects--
wages and Hours regulations, network externalities, and worker risk aversion--, and there are
probably others.
Federal regulations require firms to pay their workers while they receive employer
sponsored training that increases productivity on their current job (even when the training is
voluntary and the skill is useful at other firms) (Bureau of National Affairs, (1993). Consequently,
the only way workers can pay for general training (as predicted by theory) is for them to accept
a lower wage rate during the training period. This is feasible for entry level training, if the
minimum wage constraint is not binding. However, for more senior workers, a wage reduction
during voluntary training in new computer applications programs or other general skills would
probably be forbidden by federal wage and hours regulations. Wage structures reflect a host of
efficiency and equity considerations. Even in non-u i  settings, changing them is costly--
particularly if compensation is being lowered. Hence when technological change makes a new
general skill valuable, the firm must decide whether to provide the training in that skill under the
constraint of its predetermined wage structure. By prohibiting the firm from asking workers to
take training during uncompensated time, federal wage and hours regulations effectively
prevent the firm from inducing its workers to share the costs of training in this general skill.
Network externalities: Many of the skills taught in company training programs are modes
of internal communication—e.g. software application programs-- th t everyone must adopt if
they are to be fully effective. If the firm were to expect workers to pay the full cost of learning
such software applications, it would not be able to demand that all workers learn it and the
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network benefits would not be realized. Consequently, it tries to get as close as possible to 100
percent usage by requiring and paying for training in a skill that is useful at other firms.
Better Informed Employers: Employers are better informed about the likely value of
various general skills than workers. Worker uncertainty about whether the particular skill taught
at their company is also useful in other jobs may make them unwilling to pay for the training
even when the skill is in fact general. Employers will be better informed about the technological
uncertainties and, therefore, better able to decide which particular skills should be taught and be
more willing to bear the risk of the investment. In many cases, the employer controls how useful
general training is on the job over the long term. Having invested in learning a skill at the behest
of their employer, workers quite sensibly want to be assured that the company will not shortly be
switching to a different E mail system or applications program. Firms assure their workers such
switches will be infrequent by offering to pay any training costs that result.
Worker risk aversion results in employment contracts in which compensation does not
rise and fall proportionately with actual productivity on-the-job (Stiglitz 1974; Bishop 1987).
Firms are held liable when a mistake by an employee damages or kills others. Such implicit
contracts weaken worker rewards for better performance and reduce their incentive to improve
skills. Employers could reward their workers for developing skills, but this would signal the skill
to other firms. A subtler way of inducing training investments is to subsidize it directly and to
make it mandatory.
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Table 1
The Effect of Receiving Training on a Worker's Starting Wage
Males Females Mean Mean
White White
Males Females
Number of different types
of training received on .022 .016 .040* * * .030* *    .65      .78
the job (range 1-5) (1.56) (1.05) (3.40) (2.38)
Total Hours of Training (100's) --- .007 --- .006   1.85      .88
(1.42) (.89)
Total Hours Training Squared --- -.00025 * * --- -.00016 42.1 11.0
(10,000's) (2.24) (.93)
Dummys for Industry & no yes no yes
Occupation Included
R Square .065 .131 .078 .121
The dependent variable is the log of the deflated starting wage of the current or most recent job. The sample is 1980 high school
graduates who in 1984 were not attending college full time and do not have a military occupation. The background
characteristics that are controlled include: time spent attending college during 1982 and 1983, work experience and vocational
training in high school, high school GPA, grades in trade and business courses, test scores, attitudes toward work and school,
number of extra curricular activities and leadership positions, self esteem, locus of control, deportment in high school, married,
children, number of siblings, race, hispanic, parental income, parental education, parental occupation, urban, rural and 10
regional dummies and length of tenure on job and its square.
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Table 2
Effect of Indicators of Learning Ability
on Receipt of Employer Sponsored Training
Received Hrs of Formal
Formal or Informal and Informal
Mean S.D. Training   Training
Men Women Men Women
Test Score 52.3 8.8 -.013 .004** - .7 .82
(1.19) (2.32) (.34) (.80)
GPA 81.6 7.6 -.004* -.0026 4.3** -1.86*
(1.91) (1.47) (2.05) (1.74)
High Grades-Bus/Clerical .40  .49 .005 .033 -43.0 -2.0
( .17) (1.51) (1.55) ( .15)
High Grades-Trade & Tech .18 .38 .012 .014 32.6 53.4**
( .45) ( .35) (1.11) (2.39)
Good Deportment (1-30) 4.2 3.4 -.003 .0007 - .6 -1.3
( .84) ( .17) (.15) ( .54)
Vocational Courses 2.3 2.0 .003 .116** 4.3 7.2*
( .52) (2.39) (.67) (1.82)
Academic Courses 10.1 2.9 -.013*** -.003 -5.2 4.8*
(2.64) ( .79) (1.01) (1.90)
Did Not Graduate .01 .09 -.10 .12 9.9 155.0*
( .78) ( .80) ( .71) (1.8)
Wkly. Hours on Homework 3.3 2.5 -.001 -.0083** 1.96 -.67
( .20) (1.96) (.36) (.26)
Wkly. Hours in Jobs 16.0 10.1 .003*** .0048*** 1.21.4**
(2.75) (4.35) (.95) (2.11)
Wkly. Hours Watching TV 20.5 11.7 .000 -.0013 .32 -.006
( .003) (1.55) (.30) ( .01)
# Leadership Roles (1-7) .70 1.00 -.004 -.007 10.4 8.1
( .13) ( .24) (.37)   (.45)
Internal Locus of Control (0-4) 2.72 .66 .02 .005 45.3** -10.7
(1.08) (.27) (2.27)    (1.03)
Negative Self Esteem (0-4) .99 .72 -.012 -.029** -14.3 - .4
( .73) (2.12) (.81) (.05)
Work Orientation (0-4.9) 3.39 .67 .026 .007 10.9 5.7
(1.38) ( .48) ( .55) ( .64)
Study Habit Problems (0-4) 1.15 .96 .006 .025** 19.4 1.3
( .46) (2.04) (1.42) ( .18)
Reads a lot (0-3) 1.68 .87 -.004 -.004 -3.5 -1.8
( .31) ( .34) (.23) ( .25)
Enjoys working for pay (0-1) .91 .28 .064 -.054 63.7 -1.5
(1.64) (1.45) (1.54) (.07)
R2 .071 .063 .069 .044
Mean of Dependent Variable .39 .41 133 69
Standard Deviation of Dep. Var. .49 .49 499 250
___________________________________________________________________________
The sample was limited to those who reported a wage rate on their current or most recent job. This resulted in 2554 females and
1938 males. The models included controls for region, suburban, rural, age, race, Hispanic, number of siblings, handicapping
conditions, religious attendance, parental family income, "parents always knew where I was" scale, enrolled in post secondary
education, in the military, length of time at the job, and participation in cooperative vocational education, work study, Talent
Search or CETA.
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Table 3:  Impact of Training on Growth of Productivity and Wage Rates
Logarithmic Model
Productivity                        Productivity                    Wage Rate
Typical Worker Specific Worker Specific Worker
Mean SD (2 Yrs.) (avg. of 1.2 Yrs) (avg. of 1.2 Yrs)
Logarithm of
Training Length 1.84 1.28 .059*** .057*** .047*** .045*** .0067** .0065*
(5.52) (5.35) (3.98) (3.02) (1.99) (1.93)
Training Intensity 4.33 1.31 -.123** -.136** -.095 -.092 -.0005 .0055
(2.28) (2.50) (1.61) (1.56) (.03) (.31)
Training Intensity2 20     11 .032*** .031*** .026*** .023*** .00165 .00073
(4.88) (4.63) (3.65) (3.18) (.81) (.35)
Interaction of Log Training
Intensity with
General Skill% 3.29 1.86 .000 .003 .0029
( .01) ( .35) (1.05)
Formal OJT% .29 .86 .040** .061*** .0139***
(2.47) (3.43)   (2.75)
Co-worker OJT% .74 .91 .031** .035** -.0011
(2.03) (2.10) ( .24)
Watch Others OJT% 1.12 1.08 .048*** .044*** .0074*
(3.60) (3.07) (1.81)
Tenure
For Specific Worker 1.16 1.24 .0786** .0798** .098*** .098***
(2.44)   (2.48) (10.30) (10.25)
Tenure SQ 2.90 9.04 -.0076* -.0080* -.0024* -.0024*
(1.70) (1.79) (1.73) (1.72)
Characteristics of Job and Firm X X X X X X
Characteristics of the New Hire X X X X
Impact of Training Intensity Increase
From 10 to 100 hours .226 .181 .202 .154 .0262 .0242
From 100 to 200 hours .134 .119 .115 .094 .0129 .0088
Free 200 to 300 hours .093 .083 .079 .065 .0083 .0055
Formal Training from 100 to 200 hours    -- .147        -- .136 -- .0184
Coworker OJT from 100 to 200 hours   -- .130        -- .118 -- .0089
Watching others from 100 to 200 hours       -- .152        -- .124 -- .0136
Standard error of estimate                  .596 .594     .626 .623 .178 .178
R2 .174 .180 .170 .178 .234 .238
Number of Observations 2116 2116 2002 2002 1963 1963
____________________________________________________________________________
Analysis of EOPP Employer Survey. The job and firm characteristics controlled in all models were dummies for seven
occupational categories, sun of the DOT General Education Development ratings, DOT Specific vocational preparation rating,
rating of the importance of vocational education, hours worked per week, proportion of workers high skill. proportion of craft
workers, cost of capital equipment used in job, indicator of difficulty of finding qualified workers and percentage of employees
under the age of 25. When a particular worker's wage and productivity outcomes were the dependent variable, controls were
included for the following worker characteristics: years of schooling, relevant vocational schooling dummy, years of relevant work
experience and its square, years of non-relevant work experience and its square, female dummy, and tenure and its square. The
arithmetic mean of training intensity during the first 3 months was 149 hours. The geometric mean was 76 hours. In the years
prior to the survey, inflation ran at a 6 percent annual pace. The wage changes analyzed were not deflated for price inflation, so
the coefficient on tenure in the wage growth model reflects price inflation as well as gains in real wages.
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Table 3A
Impact of Training on Growth of Productivity and Wage Rates
Linear Model
Productivity ProductivityWage Rate
Typical WorkerSpecific Worker    Specific Worker
Mean    SD (2 Yrs.)(avg. of 1.2 Yrs)(avg. of 1.2 Yrs)
Logarithm of
Training Length 1.84 1.28 .0264*** .0258*** .0187*** .0182*** .0045 .0040
(4.98) (4.89) (3.26) (3.18) ( .89) ( .79)
Training Intensity 4.33 1.31 .0139 .0060 .0383 .0418 -.0294 -.0215
( .52) (.23) (1.50) (1.44) (1.15) (.83)
Training Intensity2 20 11 .0059* .0600* .0005 .0000 .0053* .0042
(1.83) (1.85) ( .16) ( .01) (1.73) (1.33)
Interaction of Log Training
Intensity with
General Skill% 3.29 1.86 .0007 .0016 .0071*
( .16) ( .35) (1.72)
Formal OJT% .29 .86 .0084 .061*** .0203***
(1.04) (3.43) (2.66)
Co-worker OJT% .74 .91 .0166** .035** -.0028
(2.19) (2.10) ( .39)
Watch Others OJT% 1.12 1.08 .0150** .044*** .0173***
(2.29) (3.07) (2.79)
Tenure
For Specific Worker 1.16 1.24 .0786** .0781*** .0968*** .0956***
(2.44)   (4.96)   (6.69) (6.62)
Tenure SQ            2.90 9.04 -.0076* -.0080*** -.0045**  -.0044**
  (1.70)   (3.65)   (2.14) (2.13)
Characteristics of Job and Firm X X X X X X
Characteristics of the New Hire X X X X
Impact of Training Intensity Increase
From 10 to 100 hours .128 .109 .100 .096 .0331 .0175
From 100 to 200 hours .051 .045 .031 .029 .0210 .0139
From 200 to 300 hours .032 .029 .018 .017 .0146 .0100
Formal Training from 100 to 200 hours  -- .051 -- .071 -- .0280
  Coworker OJT from 100 to 200 hours -- .057 -- .053 -- .0120
  Watching others from 100 to 200 hours -- .056 -- .059 -- .0259
Standard error of estimate .293 .292 .305 .305 .269 .268
R2 .140 .144 .147 .150 .120 .125
Number of Observations 2116 2116 2002 2002 1963 1963
____________________________________________________________________________
Analysis of EOPP Employer Survey. The job and firm characteristics controlled in all models were dummies for seven
occupational categories, sun of the DOT General Education Development ratings, DOT Specific vocational preparation rating,
rating of the importance of vocational education, hours worked per week, proportion of workers high skill, proportion of craft
workers, cost of capital equipment used in job, indicator of difficulty of finding qualified workers and percentage of employees
under the age of 25. When a particular worker's wage and productivity outcomes were the dependent variable, controls were
included for the following worker characteristics: years of schooling, relevant vocational schooling dummy, years of relevant work
experience and its square, years of non-relevant work experience and its square. female dummy, and tenure and its square. The
arithmetic mean of training intensity during the first 3 months was 149 hours. The geometric mean was 76 hours. In the years
prior to the survey, inflation ran at a 6 percent annual pace. The wage changes analyzed were not deflated for price inflation, so
the coefficient on tenure in the wage growth model reflects price inflation as well as gains in real wages.
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Table 4
Comparison of OLS & Instrumental Variable Estimates
of the Impact of Training
Training Training  Log  of R2
Intensity  Intensity Training
Productivity Growth (100's hrs.)  Squared
(Linear) (10,000's)
OLS .112*** -.012*** .026*** .142
Typical Hire (9.3) (6.5) (4.9)
2SLS .333*** -.034* -.058* .076
(3.1) (1.8) (1.7)
Particular     OLS .107*** -.014*** .017*** .152
New Hire (8.) (6.8) (3.2)
(1.2 Years)




OLS       .028***          -.0023*                .0082**         .197
Typical Hire       (3.5)            (1.8)                (2.3)
2SLS        .147*     -.025*                    .010    .181
(1.9)      (1.9)                      (4)
OLS          .022***     -.0019                  .0072**    .232
Particular       (2.8)             (1.6)                 (2.1)
New Hire
(1.2 Years) 2SLS      -.009           -.0039                .048**        .223
(.1)                                 (2.1)
* Significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** Significant at the 5% level (two-sided)
*** Significant at the 1% level (two-sided)
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Table 5
Impact of General Training
on the Growth of Productivity and Wage Rates
in NFIB Data
     Log Training Hours Log Training Hrs         Number of
                            during First 6 Mo.         X Specific Share           R Square        RMSE         Observations
 Growth of
Productivity
OLS .0265*** -.0012 .1883 .1175     1242
(8.34) ( .36)
2SLS .0328** -.0001 .1438 .1183 1182
(2.32) ( .04)
Wage Rates
OLS .0011 .0035*** .2369 .0450 1242
( .94)    (2.78)
2SLS .0058   .0037*** .2290 .0455 1182
(1.06)   (2.60)
Profits
OLS .0254*** -.0047 .1637 .1201 1242
(7.80) (1.40)
2SLS .0270* -.0038 .1286 .1209 1182
  (1.87) (1.02)
____________________________________________________________________________
Analysis of a 1984 survey of members of the National Federation of Independent Business.
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NFIB ANALYSIS--ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES
X SECTION OF INDIV--5 reference var--SUBST HIRYY FORTENYY 16:02 Friday, October 11, 1996 16




Source DF Squares Square               FValue Prob>F
Model 55 4.72986 0.08600 6.233 0.0001
Error 1186 16.36261 0.01380
C Total 1241 21.09248
Root MSE 0.11746 R-square 0.2242
Dep Mean                     0.12415 Adj R-sq       0.1883
C.V.                            94.61036
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard                   T for H0:
Variable              DF Estimate Error                 Parameter=0      Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 -0.098062 0.06688823 -1.466 0.1429
TENYY 1 0.017461 0.00683737 2.554 0.0108
TENSQYY 1 -0.001958 0.00091070 -2.150 0.0318
LTTYY 1 0.026525 0.00318023 8.341 0.0001
SPLTTYY 1 -0.001196 0.00328345 -0.364 0.7157
YROCCYY 1 -0.003620 0.00388585 -0.932 0.3517
SCHYY 1 0.007536 0.00228487 3.298 0.0010
EXPYY 1 -0.008909 0.00207709 -4.289 0.0001
EXPYYSQ 1 0.000254 0.00008867 2.859 0.0043
AGEYY 1 0.000689 0.00113404 0.608 0.5435
AGESQYY 1 0.000004158 0.00002939 0.141 0.8875
BLKYY 1 -0.004152 0.01736639 -0.239 0.8111
HISPYY 1 -0.008474 0.01792729 -0.473 0.6365
FEMYY 1 0.003310 0.01150415 0.288 0.7736
MARYY 1 -0.010494 0.01129739 -0.929 0.3531
NEWPAPYY 1 -0.002132 0.00876288 -0.243 0.8078
RSUPYY 1 -0.009592 0.00743162 -1.291 0.1971
PERSOFYY 1 -0.025523 0.01762298 -1.448 0.1478
IGPYY 1 -0.006934 0.00764602 -0.907 0.3647
RPREVYY 1 -0.002168 0.00807748 -0.268 0.7885
HUSBYY 1 0.016355 0.01397022 1.171 0.2419
TONYY 1 -0.002411 0.00810507 -0.297 0.7662
TOFYY 1 0.012755 0.01406706 0.907 0.3647
TRPUBYY 1 -0.006966 0.01069841 -0.651 0.5151
TRPRIYY 1 -0.019633 0.01187893 -1.653 0.0986
TRMILYY 1 -0.032907 0.01791992 -1.836 0.0666
TRJTPAYY 1 -0.047335 0.02547844 -1.858 0.0634
IMPOCCB 1 0.001594 0.00247547 0.644 0.5196
IMPLRNB 1 0.001594 0.00306436 0.520 0.6030
IMPHABB 1 -0.003633 0.00376144 -0.966 0.3343
IMPLEADB 1 0.000552 0.00374851 0.147 0.8830
IMPREADB 1 -0.005583 0.00270205 -2.066 0.0390
CRAFT 1 -0.007999 0.02766010 -0.289 0.7725
CONST 1 -0.023611 0.02824474 -0.836 0.4034
SREP 1 0.018541 0.02851125 0.650 0.5156
RETAIL 1 -0.017458 0.02865919 -0.609 0.5425
SERV 1 -0.001820 0.02985327 -0.061 0.9514
LAB 1 -0.035900 0.02960865 -1.212 0.2256
MANAG 1 -0.018574 0.04375113 -0.425 0.6713
CLERK 1 0.004491 0.02891837 0.155 0.8766
SEC 1 0.063210 0.02993363 2.112 0.0349
TECH 1 0.029504 0.02831430 1.042 0.2976
PROF 1 -0.004128 0.03027544 -0.136 0.8916
OPER 1 0.002338 0.03024866 0.077 0.9384
TOPER 1 -0.000334 0.03370016 -0.010 0.9921
OTHER 1 0.017776 0.02937048 0.605 0.5451
GRTHEMP 1 0.007914 0.00750408 1.055 0.2918
PIECE 1 -0.009397 0.00940183 -1.000 0.3177
GROUPI 1 0.011086 0.00999102 1.110 0.2674
VALUELN 1 0.001805 0.00251044 0.719 0.4722
FMATH 1 0.001796 0.00489239 0.367 0.7136
FCOMPUTR 1 -0.001737 0.00250311 -0.694 0.4880
FNEWSKIL 1 0.010786 0.00429682 2.510 0.0122
FCOMM 1 0.002748 0.00441152 0.623 0.5334
FSUPER 1 -0.012132 0.00396872 -3.057 0.0023
ACCUPERF 1 0.001795 0.00315537 0.569 0.5695
Dependent Variable: PGRCR2YY
Test: TRSP Numerator: 0.5660 DF: 1 F value:  41.0259
Denominator: 0.013796 DF: 1186 Prob>F:  0.0001
Test: WORK Numerator: 0.0377 DF: 5 F value: 2.7292
Denominator: 0.013796 DF: 1186 Prob>F: 0.0185
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Source DF Squares Square F  Value Prob>F
Model 55 0.89036 0.01619 8.005 0.0001
Error 1186 2.39830 0.00202
C Total 1241 3.28866
Root MSE 0.04497 R-square 0.2707
Dep Mean                     0.04513  Adj R-sq      0.2369
C.V.                             99.64565
Parameter Estimates
     Parameter    Standard             T for H0:
Variable              DF                 Estimate                       Error                      Par meter=0            Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 0.014029 0.02560795 0.548 0.5839
TENYY 1 0.031226 0.00261767 11.929 0.0001
TENSQYY 1 -0.002378 0.00034866 -6.822 0.0001
LTTYY 1 0.001149 0.00121754 0.944 0.3455
SPLTTYY 1 0.003496 0.00125706 2.781 0.0055
YROCCYY 1 -0.000832 0.00148769 -0.559 0.5763
SCHYY 1 0.000733 0.00087476 0.838 0.4022
EXPYY 1 -0.001202 0.00079521 -1.512 0.1309
EXPYYSQ 1 0.000023675 0.00003395 0.697 0.4857
AGEYY 1 0.000344 0.00043416 0.792 0.4287
AGESQYY 1 -0.000014736 0.00001125 -1.310 0.1906
BLKYY 1 -0.009744 0.00664867 -1.466 0.1430
HISPYY 1 -0.008151 0.00686341 -1.188 0.2352
FEMYY 1 -0.004880 0.00440433 -1.108 0.2681
MARYY 1 -0.002162 0.00432517 -0.500 0.6173
NEWPAPYY 1 0.001559 0.00335484 0.465 0.6421
RSUPYY 1 0.003286 0.00284517 1.155 0.2484
PERSOFYY 1 0.008871 0.00674690 1.315 0.1888
IGPYY 1 0.001322 0.00292725 0.452 0.6515
RPREVYY 1 0.002132 0.00309244 0.690 0.4906
HUSBYY 1 -0.002492 0.00534846 -0.466 0.6413
TONYY 1 -0.005892 0.00310300 -1.899 0.0578
TOFYY 1 0.004317 0.00538553 0.802 0.4230
TRPUBYY 1 0.003360 0.00409585 0.820 0.4122
TRPRIYY 1 0.001799 0.00454781 0.396 0.6925
TRMILYY 1 -0.002531 0.00686059 -0.369 0.7122
TRJTPAYY 1 -0.021469 0.00975434 -2.201 0.0279
IMPOCCB 1 -0.000872 0.00094773 -0.920 0.3575
IMPLRNB 1 0.000324 0.00117318 0.276 0.7827
IMPHABB 1 -0.002167 0.00144006 -1.505 0.1326
IMPLEADB 1 -0.000467 0.00143511 -0.325 0.7451
IMPREADB 1 -0.000074457 0.00103447 -0.072 0.9426
CRAFT 1 -0.033567 0.01058958 -3.170 0.0016
CONST 1 -0.033222 0.01081341 -3.072 0.0022
SREP 1 -0.049678 0.01091545 -4.551 0.0001
RETAIL 1 -0.035581 0.01097208 -3.243 0.0012
SERV 1 -0.044233 0.01142923 -3.870 0.0001
LAB 1 -0.038260 0.01133558 -3.375 0.0008
MANAG 1 -0.072028 0.01674999 -4.300 0.0001
CLERK 1 -0.035493 0.01107131 -3.206 0.0014
SEC 1 -0.044102 0.01146000 -3.848 0.0001
TECH 1 -0.035558 0.01084004 -3.280 0.0011
PROF 1 -0.054141 0.01159086 -4.671 0.0001
OPER 1 -0.045395 0.01158060 -3.920 0.0001
TOPER 1 -0.041096 0.01290200 -3.185 0.0015
OTHER 1 -0.041976 0.01124440 -3.733 0.0002
GRTHEMP 1 0.002643 0.00287291 0.920 0.3577
PIECE 1 0.004559 0.00359946 1.267 0.2056
GROUPI 1 0.004448 0.00382503 1.163 0.2451
VALUELN 1 0.001176 0.00096111 1.223 0.2215
FMATH 1 -0.002122 0.00187304 -1.133 0.2576
FCOMPUTR 1 -0.000917 0.00095831 -0.957 0.3389
FNEWSKIL 1 0.001627 0.00164503 0.989 0.3228
FCOMM 1 0.004093 0.00168894 2.424 0.0155
FSUPER 1 -0.000078227 0.00151941 -0.051 0.9589
ACCUPERF 1 0.000307 0.00120802 0.255 0.7991
Dependent Variable: GRWAGEYY
Test: TRSP Numerator:         0.0190 DF: 1 F value: 9.4158
Denominator:  0.002022 DF: 1186 Prob>F: 0.0022
Dependent Variable: GRWAGEYY
Test: WORK Numerator:          0.0032 DF: 5 F value: 1.5813
Denominator:   0.002022 DF: 1186 Prob>F: 0.1624
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Source DF                 Squares                    Square              F Value Prob>F
Model 55 4.29773 0.07814 5.416 0.0001
Error 1186 17.11174 0.01443
C Total 1241 21.40946
Root MSE 0.12012 R-square 0.2007
Dep Mean 0.07902 Adj R-sq 0.1637
C.V.  152.00631
Parameter Estimates
     Parameter     Standard            T for H0:
Variable              DF                 Estimate                       Error                       Parameter=0               Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 -0.112091 0.06840226 -1.639 0.1015
TENYY 1 -0.013765 0.00699214 -1.969 0.0492
TENSQYY 1 0.000421 0.00093132 0.452 0.6515
LTTYY 1 0.025376 0.00325222 7.803 0.0001
SPLTTYY 1 -0.004693 0.00335777 -1.398 0.1625
YROCCYY 1 -0.002788 0.00397381 -0.702 0.4830
SCHYY 1 0.006803 0.00233659 2.912 0.0037
EXPYY 1 -0.007706 0.00212411 -3.628 0.0003
EXPYYSQ 1 0.000230 0.00009068 2.535 0.0114
AGEYY 1 0.000345 0.00115971 0.298 0.7658
AGESQYY 1 0.000018894 0.00003006 0.629 0.5297
BLKYY 1 0.005592 0.01775948 0.315 0.7529
HISPYY 1 -0.000323 0.01833308 -0.018 0.9860
FEMYY 1 0.008190 0.01176455 0.696 0.4865
MARYY 1 -0.008332 0.01155311 -0.721 0.4709
NEWPAPYY 1 -0.003691 0.00896122 -0.412 0.6805
RSUPYY 1 -0.012878 0.00759983 -1.694 0.0904
PERSOFYY 1 -0.034395 0.01802188 -1.908 0.0566
IGPYY 1 -0.008256 0.00781909 -1.056 0.2912
RPREVYY 1 -0.004300 0.00826032 -0.521 0.6028
HUSBYY 1 0.018848 0.01428644 1.319 0.1873
TONYY 1 0.003481 0.00828852 0.420 0.6745
TOFYY 1 0.008438 0.01438547 0.587 0.5576
TRPUBYY 1 -0.010326 0.01094057 -0.944 0.3454
TRPRIYY 1 -0.021433 0.01214781 -1.764 0.0779
TRMILYY 1 -0.030375 0.01832554 -1.658 0.0977
TRJTPAYY 1 -0.025867 0.02605514 -0.993 0.3210
IMPOCCB 1 0.002467 0.00253151 0.974 0.3300
IMPLRNB 1 0.001271 0.00313372 0.405 0.6852
IMPHABB 1 -0.001466 0.00384658 -0.381 0.7032
IMPLEADB 1 0.001019 0.00383336 0.266 0.7905
IMPREADB 1 -0.005509 0.00276321 -1.994 0.0464
CRAFT 1 0.025568 0.02828619 0.904 0.3662
CONST 1 0.009611 0.02888406 0.333 0.7394
SREP 1 0.068219 0.02915661 2.340 0.0195
RETAIL 1 0.018123 0.02930790 0.618 0.5365
SERV 1 0.042413 0.03052900 1.389 0.1650
LAB 1 0.002361 0.03027885 0.078 0.9379
MANAG 1 0.053454 0.04474144 1.195 0.2324
CLERK 1 0.039984 0.02957294 1.352 0.1766
SEC 1 0.107312 0.03061118 3.506 0.0005
TECH 1 0.065061 0.02895519 2.247 0.0248
PROF 1 0.050013 0.03096073 1.615 0.1065
OPER 1 0.047733 0.03093334 1.543 0.1231
TOPER 1 0.040762 0.03446296 1.183 0.2371
OTHER 1 0.059752 0.03003529 1.989 0.0469
GRTHEMP 1 0.005270 0.00767394 0.687 0.4924
PIECE 1 -0.013956 0.00961465 -1.452 0.1469
GROUPI 1 0.006637 0.01021716 0.650 0.5161
VALUELN 1 0.000630 0.00256726 0.245 0.8063
FMATH 1 0.003918 0.00500313 0.783 0.4337
FCOMPUTR 1 -0.000820 0.00255976 -0.320 0.7489
FNEWSKIL 1 0.009159 0.00439408 2.084 0.0373
FCOMM 1 -0.001345 0.00451138 -0.298 0.7657
FSUPER 1 -0.012053 0.00405855 -2.970 0.0030
ACCUPERF 1 0.001488 0.00322679 0.461 0.6448
Dependent Variable: PROFI2YY
Test: TRSP Numerator: 0.3774 DF: 1 F value: 26.1592
Denominator: 0.014428 DF: 1186 Prob>F: 0.0001
Dependent Variable: PROFI2YY
Test: WORK Numerator: 0.0334 DF: 5 F value: 2.3171
Denominator: 0.014428 DF: 1186 Prob>F: 0.0416
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X SECTION OF INDIV--5 reference var--SUBST HIRYY FORTENYY 16:02 Friday, October 11, 1996 62
TR=0 WHEN LEAVE EARLY-ImP vars edited--FORON MISSING EDIT
SYSLIN Procedure





Source DF Squares Square F Value Prob>F
Model 55 3.54733 0.06450 4.611 0.0001
Error 1127 15.76481 0.01399
C Total 1182 20.12397
Root MSE 0.11827 R-Square 0.1837
Dep Mean 0.12235 Adj R-SQ 0.1438
C.V. 96.66697
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard       T for H0:
Variable DF Estimate Error              Parameter=0      Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 -0.091884 0.074477 -1.234 0.2176
TENYY 1 0.015860 0.007034 2.255 0.0243
TENSQYY 1 -0.001760 0.000930 -1.892 0.0588
LTTYY 1 0.032777 0.014145 2.317 0.0207
SPLTTYY 1 -0.000136 0.003649 -0.037 0.9703
YROCCYY 1 -0.002621 0.004112 -0.637 0.5240
SCHYY 1 0.006836 0.002429 2.814 0.0050
EXPYY 1 -0.008203 0.002379 -3.448 0.0006
EXPYYSQ 1 0.000236 0.000092856 2.541 0.0112
AGEYY 1 0.000729 0.001168 0.625 0.5323
AGESQYY 1 0.000004182 0.000029962 0.140 0.8890
BLKYY 1 -0.008568 0.018074 -0.474 0.6356
HISPYY 1 -0.011168 0.018825 -0.593 0.5531
FEMYY 1 0.005597 0.011851 0.472 0.6368
MARYY 1 -0.011020 0.011640 -0.947 0.3440
NEWPAPYY 1 -0.004212 0.009107 -0.463 0.6438
RSUPYY 1 -0.010072 0.007694 -1.309 0.1908
PERSOFYY 1 -0.023551 0.018345 -1.284 0.1995
IGPYY 1 -0.009032 0.008197 -1.102 0.2707
RPREVYY 1 -0.001087 0.008348 -0.130 0.8964
HUSBYY 1 0.017397 0.014432 1.206 0.2283
TONYY 1 -0.005285 0.008394 -0.630 0.5291
TOFYY 1 0.009775 0.014968 0.653 0.5139
TRPUBYY 1 -0.009616 0.011243 -0.855 0.3926
TRPRIYY 1 -0.019029 0.012304 -1.547 0.1222
TRMILYY 1 -0.032840 0.018660 -1.760 0.0787
TRJTPAYY 1 -0.050410 0.026219 -1.923 0.0548
IMPOCCB 1 -0.000498 0.002589 -0.193 0.8474
IMPLRNB 1 0.001765 0.003210 0.550 0.5827
IMPHABB 1 -0.003912 0.003872 -1.010 0.3125
IMPLEADB 1 0.000687 0.003827 0.179 0.8577
IMPREADB 1 -0.005544 0.002808 -1.975 0.0486
CRAFT 1 -0.017014 0.028083 -0.606 0.5447
CONST 1 -0.027861 0.028632 -0.973 0.3307
SREP 1 0.020987 0.029014 0.723 0.4696
RETAIL 1 -0.016282 0.029184 -0.558 0.5770
SERV 1 -0.007510 0.030341 -0.247 0.8046
LAB 1 -0.037111 0.030105 -1.233 0.2179
MANAG 1 -0.013422 0.044310 -0.303 0.7620
CLERK 1 0.006968 0.029404 0.237 0.8127
SEC 1 0.060281 0.030376 1.984 0.0474
TECH 1 0.022382 0.028718 0.779 0.4359
PROF 1 -0.002619 0.031163 -0.084 0.9330
OPER 1 -0.004082 0.030557 -0.134 0.8938
TOPER 1 -0.004791 0.034215 -0.140 0.8887
OTHER 1 0.018104 0.030230 0.599 0.5494
GRTHEMP 1 0.007166 0.007826 0.916 0.3600
PIECE 1 -0.010538 0.009615 -1.096 0.2733
GROUPI 1 0.015948 0.010353 1.540 0.1237
VALUELN 1 0.001290 0.002708 0.476 0.6340
FMATH 1 0.001962 0.005589 0.351 0.7257
FCOMPUTR 1 -0.002571 0.002594 -0.991 0.3219
FNEWSKIL 1 0.011093 0.004848 2.288 0.0223
FCOMM 1 -0.000382 0.005556 -0.069 0.9451
FSUPER 1 -0.010682 0.004409 -2.423 0.0156
ACCUPERF 1 0-000784 0.003235 0.242 0.8087
Test: TRSP
Numerator: 0.064508 DF: 1 F Value: 4.6116
Denominator: 0.013988 DF: 1127 Prob>F: 0.0320
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Test: IMP
Numerator: 0.016857 DF: 5 F Value: 1.2051
Denominator: 0.013988 DF: 1127 Prob>F: 0.3045
Test: WORK
Numerator: 0.03217 DF: 5 F Value: 2.2997
Denominator: 0.013988 DF: 1127 Prob>F: 0.0431
Test: RC
Numerator: 0.013375 DF: 5 F Value: 0.9561
Denominator: 0.013988 DF: 1127 Prob>F: 0.4437
Test: OCC
Numerator: 0.029349 DF: 14 F Value: 2.0981
Denominator: 0_013988 DF: 1127 Prob>F: 0.0100




With respect to W2:
¶Pr(K)/ ¶W2 = -f0 ¶Pr(S)/ ¶W2 = f (1-  f0     Fb) = f (1-v)
                                                                              Pr(K)2
With respect to g:
¶Pr(K) / ¶g = f0 ¶Pr(S)/¶g = f (-Ug +  f0     Fb) = f (-Ug  + v)
                                                                              Pr(K)2
With respect to h:
¶Pr(K)/ ¶h = f0 ¶Pr(S)/ ¶h = f (  f0     Fb) = fv
                                                                        Pr(K)2















































































































































Differentiation of (*) Pr(S) Pr(K) Ga
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we can obtain (5’), (6’), and (7’) by substituting the above results.
Derivation of (13’)
Denote K = Pr(K), S = Pr(S), K’ = ¶Pr(K)/¶W2, S’ = ¶Pr(S)/¶W2. The foc for W2 is written as
da[S’KQa-SK] + db[SK+K’SQb] = 0
Qa= P+g+h+E (Î0 I K)-W2, x1= P+g+h+E(Î0 I K)
Qb*= W
2-P-g+T-E(Î I S) +Fb=W2+x2, x2= P+g-T+E(Î I S)-Fb



























































Derivation of (14’ and 15’)













Adding RHS of  (5’) to (6’) we obtain (14’)
(12’) })1{()1( SKSKKQC baag +-+-= bdbfd
An alternative expression is obtained by removing Qa from (7’) (This corresponds to old





























Also, the expression for Ch can be modified by substituting the foc for W
2. Again addition
of the RHS of (5’) to the foc for h (6’):
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